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L Introduction
The argument for Social Security privatization is, at bottom, simple: we
need more, and better, advance funding of the public retirement system.1 In
particular, we need to commit a portion of FICA tax to privately managed
investment accounts, which will purchase investment instruments that promise
higher rates of return than the government debt instruments in which the
Social Security surplus is currently invested.2 The privatization debate has
centered on the extent to which Social Security faces an impending demo-
graphic crisis during the coming decades,3 whether privatization is fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the idea of social insurance,4 whether privatization
financial projections are accurate,5 and whether privatization is a more ratio-
nal means of securing and improving the financial status of retirees than the
current Social Security system.6
The privatization debate, however, has been peculiarly divorced from the
reality that this nation already has a massive retirement system in place in
which the funding is almost entirely committed to privat investment markets:
the employment-based pension system. This employment-based pension
system is sometimes referred to as the private pension system, although the
adjective "private" is something of a misnomer. The federal government con-
1. See, e.g., Final Report of the President's Commission on Social Security (Dec. 21,
2001), available at http://www.csss.gov/reports/Final reportpdf [hereinafter "Report"] (finding
that existing Social Security system does not save for future and therefore future solvency
depends on increased savings and investment at present); SOCIAL SECURiTY, PROSPECTS FOR
REAL REFORM 6-7 (Peter Ferrara ed., 1985) (arguing that Super IRAs can be used to expand
current Social Security system); Thomas F. Siems, Reengineering Social Security in the New
Economy, in 22 THE CATO PROJECr ONSOCIAL SEcuRrYPRIVATIZATION 2 (2001) (considering
social security privatization as means to provide same retirement security in new economy as old
economy under PAYGO system). The authors note that some proponents of a privatized Social
Security system rest their position on ideological opposition to the idea of social insurance. The
authors rejectthose arguments, which are in any event outside the scope ofthis Article.
2. See Report, supra note 1, at 11-13.
3. Compare Report, supra note 1, at 4, with Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights
Private: The Rhetoric andRealityofSocialSecurityPrivatzation, 41 B.C. L. REV. 975,987-96
(2000) (critiquing demographic crisis rationale for privatization of Social Security).
4. See, e.g., Dilley, supra note 3, at 975; see also LAURENCE S. SEIDMAN, FUNDING
SOCIAL SECUmiTY 117-22 (1999) (noting that advocates of privatization reject concept of Social
Security as wage-related, as earned-right, as redistributive, and as inflation-protected).
5. See, e.g., ROBERT EISNER, SOCIAL SECUErY: MORE NOT LESS 5-9 (1998); see also
Paul Krugman, Editorial, Fabricating a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,2001, at A17 ("Last week
the International Monetary Fund, which has no political stake in the debate over Social Security,
told the prosaic truth: 'the long-term financing problems of Social Security are not large' and
'could be addressed through relatively small adjustments in the program's parameters.'").
6. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN E. WEUlER, UNDERMINING SOCIAL SECURITY WVTM PRIVATE
ACCOUNTS (Econ. Policy Inst. Issue Brief No. 172, Dec. 11, 2001), at http'/www.epinetorg/
Issuebriefs/ib172/1ibl72.pdf. See generally ESER, supra note 5; SEIDMAN, supra note 4.
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tributes mightily to the system through tax subsidies,7 and many employment-
based pension plans are maintained by public entities for their employees
rather than by private-sector employers! We nevertheless use the term
"private pension system" here, in large part because we focus on concerns
with private sector retirement plans.
We attempt in this Article to advance the debate over whether to privatize
Social Security by reflecting on three of the private pension system's major
problems and their relevance in the Social Security reform debate. We refer
to these issues as ones of leverage, linkage, and leakage.
By leverage, we refer to the widely accepted idea that the private pension
system is intended to encourage employers to set up plans to create retirement
security for those of their employees who would otherwise not save ade-
quately for their years outside the labor market." The government accom-
plishes this goal by providing tax incentives for business owners and manag-
ers to establish plans for themselves and then by leveraging these incentives
through regulations that require the plans also to provide benefits for low and
moderate-income employees.' ° By linkage, we refer to the idea that there
should be a close identity between the retirement benefits employees reason-
ably expect to receive under their retirement plan and what they actually
receive." By leakage, we refer to the idea that pension plans are intended to
7. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the tax expenditure for employer-
based retirement plans in the 2001 fiscal year will be approximately $100 billion. See JOINT
COMM. ONTAXATION,ESTMATEOFFEDERA4LTAxExP E sFORFisALYEARS2001-2005
(JCS-1) 2 (Apr. 6, 2001) (reporting estimates for tax expenditures based on provisions of tax
code as enacted through December31, 2001).
8. For example, the California Public Employees Retirement System ("CalPERS") covers
1.2 million workers and retirees and has over $20 billion in annual revenues. See CalPERS,
About CalPERS, Facts at a Glance, at http'/www.calpers.ca.gov/abouttfactglan/factglanhtm
(last modified Nov. 30, 2001) (providing background information and statistical data for state-
sponsored benefit retirement plan). The Federal Thrift Savings Plan for federal employees had
approximately $93 billion in assets as ofDember 31, 2000. Financial Statements of the Thrift
Savings Fund, 1999 and 2000 (Mar. 14,2001), at 3, available at http'/www.frtib.gov/FOIA
TSP-2001-financial-stmtpdf (providing general information regarding retirement savings and
investment plan for federal employees).
9. See generally Daniel I. Halperin, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: A Rational
Modelfor the 21stCentury, in SEARCHFORANAnONALRETIREMENT INCOME POUCY 159 (Jack
L. VanDerhei ed., 1987).
10. See Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for QualifiedRetirementPlans: Good Inten-
tions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REv. 419,420 (1984) (exploring congressional
grant of substantial tax advantages to qualified retirement plans designed to ensure that retire-
ment plans flow to lower-paid employees).
11. This was, in fact, a major congressional purpose in enacting ERISA. See, e.g.,
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR & PUB. WEFARE, S. REP. No. 93-127, at 5, 8 (1973); 119 CoNG.
REc. 130 (Jan. 4, 1973) ("Our study shows that private pension plans repeatedly fail to fulfill
their promise of retirement security. The subcommittee provided a public forum, for the fir-st
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provide retirement income, and, therefore, plan assets should not leak out of
the plan for non-retirement purposes. 2 The private pension system, in our
view, has inadequate leverage and linkage and an alarming degree of leakage.
Reflecting on these problems of the private pension system can informthe
Social Security reform debate in two significant ways. First, to the extent that
Social Security and the private pension system are understood as two com-
ponents of a unified national retirement policy, they should work in com-
plementary fashion to produce a coherent policy result that addresses the
income security needs of all, or almost all, of the nation's nonworking-aged
population. From this perspective, Social Security should backstop the weak-
nesses of the private system and satisfy objectives it does not adequately ad-
dress. Second, the private system is a funded system similar in some ways to
proposed privatization models and may hold some lessons for how a privatized
system should be designed, if one is to be designed at all. Our own view,
though, is that no design features can adequately harmonize individual invest-
ment accounts with the concept of social insurance."3 We leave the second
question to those either less committed than we to the idea of social insurance
or less skeptical about the compatibility of that idea with a Social Security
system based on private investment accounts.
Parts IL I1, and IV discuss the problems of leverage, linkage, and leakage
in the private sector pension system. Part V explores the meaning of these
problems in the private pension system for the Social Security reform debate.
11. The Problem of Leverage
Every year since 1972, the Joint Committee on Taxation has prepared a
tax expenditure budget, an estimate of the year's lost tax revenue resulting
time, for workers who have suffered because of such failures, and we listened to one heartbreak-
ing story after another of dashed hopes, broken promises, and the bleak despair of a poverty-
stricken old age... workers eloquently expressed the shock and despair they felt when they
learned that their dreams of living out retirement years in economic security were never going
to come true." (comments of Sen. Williams)); HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, PRIVATE
PENSION TAX REFORM, H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 2,8 (1974); 120 CoNG. REC. 4277 (Feb. 26,
1974) ("Too many people pay money into private pension plans year after year expecting
eventually to receive retirement income, and they end up getting nothing." (comments of Rep.
Perkins)); id. at 4319 ("Our hardest working citizens forego higher salaries in the expectation
of receiving promised pensions.... Yet I know that I am not alone in testifying to the number
of letters constituents have sent me, detailing 'horror stories' of unfulfilled pension promises."
(comments of Rep. Hollzman)).
12. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMPLOYEE WELFARE & PENSIONBENEFrrS, U.S. DEP'T
OFLABOR,REPORTOFTHEWoRKINGGROUPONRETIREMENTPLANLEAKAGE: "AREWE CASH-
ING OUT OUR FUTURE?" (Nov. 13,1998) [hereinafter CASHNG OUT OUR FUTURE?], available
at http'/www.dol.gov/dollpwba/publie/adcoun/leaknewl htm (discussing leakage problem).
13. See generally Dilley, supra note 3.
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from those provisions in the Internal Revenue Code that depart from the ordi-
nary structure of an income tax. 4 Among the provisions considered to pro-
duce tax expenditures are those that govern the tax treatment of "qualified"
employer pension plans." The Congressional Budget Office estimates the lost
tax revenue related to public and private pensions to be more than $90 billion
dollars and more than $100 billion if we include individual retirement ac-
counts. 6 This is a sizable sum; in fact, it is the largest of all the expenditures
in the tax expenditure budget. 17
Some have challenged the notion of a tax expenditure budget,'8 although
not necessarily the idea that certain tax provisions depart from the structure
of an ideal income tax or create a tay subsidy for certain types of activities.' 9
Others have argued that the tax treatment of "qualified" pension plans does
not involve tax expenditures or tax subsidies at all.c° For the purposes of this
14. See JoINT CoMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 7, at 2.
15. Id. at 4. Under a normative definition of income, contributions to a pension funding
vehicle and the earnings of the funding vehicle would be immediately taxable. In contrast, the
Internal Revenue Code provides for deferral of such income until distributed to participants as
benefits. I..C. § 402 (1994) (generally deferring taxation of participants until distribution of
benefits); LR.C. § 501(a) (1994) (providing tax-exempt status for plan's funding vehicle).
16. Id. at 22. The breakdown is $85 billion for employer plans, $5.5 for Keogh plans,
which are plans maintained by self-employed individuals for themselves and their employees;
and $10.3 billion for individual retirement accounts. This latter figure includes the earnings on
individual retirement accounts, some of which are accounts to which individuals have "rolled
over" distributions from employer plans. See .R.C. § 404(e) (1994) (detailing rules permitting
taxpayers to roll over distributions from employer plans to individual retirement accounts).
17. See JOINTCoM ONTAXATION,supra note 7, at21. The second-largest tax expendi-
ture is $66.1 billion relating to the exclusion for employer-provided health care and insurance
premiums. Id.
18. Professor Boris Bittker wrote the classic argument against the creation of a tax expen-
diture budget See generally Boris L Bittker, Accounting for Federal 'Tax Subsidies" in the
NationalBudget, 22 NAT'L TAX J.244 (1969). For a response to Professor Bittker, see Stanley
S. Surrey & William F. Helmuth, The Tax Fxpenditure Budget-Response to Professor Bittker,
22 NAT'L TAX. J. 528 (1969). For a remarkably prescient 1937 view of tax subsidy as the
equivalent to direct governmental spending, see Lawrence R. Bloomenthal, Tax Exemptions,
15 TAXES, THE TAX MAG. 269 (1937), which observed that "[a] tax exemption invariably acts
as a subsidy to the individuals benefitted thereby. The idea may seem somewhat farfetched at
first, but upon further consideration, it becomes apparent that a subsidy can arise in other ways
than by a direct grant of money from the public treasury... There is no difference in practical
effect between a cash benefit payment and an exemption from taxes levied on all others who are
not in the same class as those exempted." Id.
19. See generally Bittker, supra note 18.
20. See, e.g., Robert R. Frie & James G. Archer, Taxation and Regulation of Pension
Plans Under the InternalRevenue Code, 1967 U. i- L.F. 691,692 (1967) (explaining advan-
tages of qualified employee retirement plans); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax Treatment of Qual-
ifiedPlans: A ClassicDefense oftheStatus Quo, 66N.C.L.REV. 315,316 (1988) (arguing that
because qualified plans are not tax expenditures, they do not violate normal tax procedures).
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Article, we accept the conventional understanding that the Internal Revenue
Code does provide a valuable tax subsidy for qualified pension plans and that
the subsidy should be justified by some purpose extrinsic to the goals of an
income tax.
The orthodox explanation for the subsidy is that it provides retirement
income security for employees who would not otherwise save adequately for
retirement.21 The intended primary beneficiaries of the tax expenditure, then,
are low- and moderate-income employees, who often find it difficult to save
on their own for retirement because of immediate consumption demands.'
More affluent individuals have greater capacity to save for their retirement
without governmental assistance.
Given that the intended primary beneficiaries ofthe subsidy are low- and
moderate-income workers, the structure of the Internal Revenue Code's
subsidy of retirement plans might strike one as irrational, for its architecture
allows unreconstructed tax deferral for plan participants. The value of the tax
deferral to a given taxpayer directly correlates to that taxpayer's marginal tax
rate. Thus, the Code provides the greatest retirement tax subsidyto the people
with the greatest capacity to save for their own retirement and the smallest to
those with the smallest capacity. Understood another way, this upside-down
tax subsidy is an arguably rational component of a two-part governmental
strategyto enlist the private sector in building retirement savings for low- and
moderate-income workers.
But see Norman P. Stein, Qualified Plans and Tax Expenditures: A Reply to Professor Zelin-
sky, 9 AM. J. TAx PoL'Y 225,226-27 (1991) (arguing that regimes can be designed to satisfy
Zelinsky's tax principles without subsidizing retirement savings); Edward A. Zelinsky, Quali-
fied Plans and Identifying Tax Expenditure: A Rejoinder to Professor Stein, 9 AM. J. TAx
POL'Y 257, 258-59 (1991) (arguing that qualified plans should not be regarded as generating
tax expenditures because they satisfy normative tax principles at least as well as alternative
models for taxing qualified plans).
21. See Norman P. Stein, Of Carrots and Sticks: The ParingDown of the Qualified-Plan
Paradigm, in 1999 A.L.-AEB.A. PENSIONPOUlCYCONFEENCE: ERISAAFMR25 YEARS 193,
195; see also HR. REP. No. 99-313, at 578 (1985) ("For many years, the [Senate Finance
Committee] has supported measures that provide tax incentives designed to encourage employ-
ers to provide retirement benefits for rank-and-file employees. It has been the committee's
intention that these tax incentives, which are more valuable for individuals with high levels of
income because of their marginal tax rates, should be available to employers only if their plans
provide benefits for rank-and-file employees."); DAN M. McGiLL ET AL, FUNDAMENTALS OF
PRiVATE PENSIONS 75 (7th ed. 1996) (explaining that nondiscrimination plans prohibit plan
benefits or contributions from favoring highly compensated employees).
22. See Halperin, supra note 9, at 164 (noting that tax benefits "are appropriate, if at all,
only for employer-sponsored plans which actually provide significant retirement income for
low- and moderate-income employees").
23. See generally NichaelA- Oberst, A Perspective on the Qualified Plan Tax Subsidy,
32 BUFF. L. REV. 603 (1983); Wolk, supra note 10.
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This strategy is first to make the tax benefits of qualified plans suffi-
ciently attractive to the tax-sensitive people who own and manage businesses
so that they decide to set up plans to capture tax benefits for themselves; and
second to require such plans, once established, to provide meaningfid benefits
not only to the people who set them up but also to their low- and moderate-
income employees. 24 The Code effects the latter part of the strategy through
a series of statutory provisions, most prominently the nondiscrimination
rules.' Professor Dan Halperin has used a (tax) carrot and (regulatory) stick
metaphor to describe the strategy.' Some have called this trickle-down
benefits policyY This is, in any event, the idea that we refer to here as lev-
erage. As the pension economist Alicia Munnell put it, "The rationale for
favorable tax treatment of qualified plans is that retirement benefits for rank-
and-file employees will exist if Congress provides tax incentives that induce
higher paid employees to support the establishment of employer-sponsored
pension plans. is2
The tax treatment of qualified plans has been subject to criticism, and
indeed, its rationale is only arguably rational?' Firms do respond to the tax
incentives by establishing plans. But firms often do not want to cover low-
24. See Wolk, supra note 10, at 434 (examining discrimination rules that have proven
inefficient in preventing employers from structuring plans to favor highly compensated em-
ployes).
25. See LR.C. § 401(aX4) (1994) (stating rules governing non-discrimination of highly
paid employees); IR.C. § 410(b) (1994) (allowing for exclusion of certain employees, non-
residents, and those covered by other provisions); see also Tress. Reg. § 1.401(a)-4 (1994)
(explaining how LR.C. § 401(aX4) applies to optional forms of benefit); Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)
(1994) (explaining minimum coverage requirements ofLR.C. § 410(b)).
26. See Daniel L Halperin, Special Tax Treatment for Employer-Based Retirement Pro-
grams: IsIt "Still" Viable as a Means ofIncreasingRetirementIncome? ShouldIt Continue?,
49 TAX L. REV. 1, 7 (1993) (arguing that while government subsidies have been cut, this should
not lead to complacency about future success of private retirement system), see also Patricia E.
Dilley, The Evolution ofEntidemen" Retirement Income and the Problem ofIntegratingPrivate
Pensions and Social Security, 30 LOY. LAL L. REV. 1063,1141 (1997) (noting that "the carrot
is the tax benefit of establishing a qualified pension plan and the stick is the limit on that benefit
imposed by the non-discrimination rules"); Stein, supra note 21, at 195 (citing Halperin's use
of carrot and stick metaphor).
27. See Stein, supra note 21, at 195 (citing "trickle-down benefits policy" as label for
strategy).
28. ALiclAI-MuN 4TEEcoNogIcsoFPRvAThPENsIoNs51 (TheBrookingsInst.
1982).
29. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 9, at 160 (stating that special tax treatment of qualified
plans is designed to encourage retirement savings but does not always meet that goal in prac-
tice); Oberst, supra note 23, at 618-28 (arguing that analysis of contribution and benefit limits
casts doubts as to whether current qualified plan regime is worth maintaining); Wolk, supra
note 10, at 421 (demonstrating that although tax subsidy component of qualified plans have met
with general approval, critics have argued that advantages of such plans are not subsidies at all).
375
58 WASH. &LEEL. REV 1369 (2001)
and moderate-income employees because those employees, at least as a group,
do not value deferred compensation at its cost to the firm.3° Accordingly,
some employers who participate in the system play a game of statutory limbo,
bending under the regulatory stick by manipulating the complexities of the
nondiscrimination rules to minimize or eliminate benefits for rank-and-file
employees, while maximizng benefits for the highly compensated.3 1 More-
over, many employers simply do not respond to the incentives and fail to
sponsor pension plans. 2 Thus, the system is both overinclusive in that it pro-
vides benefits for those who can save for their own retirement absent govern-
mental incentive, and underinclusive because it fails to cover many low- and
moderate-income workers at all and pays only minimum benefits to some of
the covered low- and moderate-income employees.
Despite these criticisms, the basic paradigm - tax benefits to encourage
plans and nondiscrimination rules to ensure that the plans provide meaningful
benefits to regular employees - has endured as the rationale for the favored
tax treatment of qualified plans. Furthermore, qualified plan coverage of the
private workforce has remained pretty much steady at around 50%11
There are, of course, different ways of measuring coverage, depending
on how the workforce itself is defined. For example, the coverage rate is only
about 42% if all workers, regardless of age, are included.34 The rate increases
to 50% if the relevant workforce excludes those under age twenty-five and
increases to 58% if it is limited to full-time workers over age twenty-five. 5
30. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan
Anti-Discrimination Provisions Desirable?, 55 U. CHL L. REV. 790, 806 (1988) (examining
argument that anti-discriminatory tax provisions generally reduce amount of cash compensation
and perceived value of compensation package to rank-and-file employees); Halperin, supra note
9, at 192 (noting possibility that low- and moderate-income employees may not value pensions
as much as current wages); Wolk, supra note 10, at 430-31 (arguing that enhanced return on
savings generated by subsidies may not be enough to sway low-income employees from their
preference for immediate compensation).
31. See Wolk, supra note 10, at 432 (arguing that under qualified plan regimes, employers
favor covering highly-compensated employees because employees are likely to value such cov-
erage and would be willing to substitute it for immediate compensation).
32. The failure to sponsor plans is primarily a small employer phenomena. Fins without
pension plans cover approximately seventy-five percent of all employees working for small
firms -those with fewer than 100 employees. An EBRI annual survey shows that the primary
reasons that small firms fail to sponsor plans are that their workers would rather be paid cash
wages and that business revenue is too uncertain. -EMPLOYEE BENEFIr RESEARCH INST., SMAiL
EMPLOYER RETEMENT SURVEY 2001 (2001) [hereinafler EBRI SURVEY].
33. See Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sunden, Private Pensions: Coverage and Benefit
Trends 1 (Pension Rights Ctr. Conversation on Coverage, 2001), available at http':/www.
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Not surprisingly, the coverage rates decline with income: the coverage rate
for the top quintile by earnings approaches 76%, drops to approximately 68%
for the second quintile, 58% for the third quintile, 40% for the fourth quintile,
and 18% for the lowest quintile. 6
There are two explanations for low coverage rates: some employees work
for firms that do not sponsor a plan, and some employees do not participate in
plans sponsored by their firms. There are three reasons for the latter explana-
tion: (1) regulations permitting firms to exclude employees with certain char-
acteristics (for example, part-time employees, employees covered by collective
bargaining agreements, employees with less than a year of service, and employ-
ees younger than age twenty-one);37 (2) regulations permitting firms to develop
additional criteria for plan coverage;38 and (3) regulations permitting firms to
establish plans - primarily 401(k) plans - under which employees must elect
to receive reduced current wages in order to participate.39
Coverage statistics do not, of course, tell the entire story about private
sector pension benefits flowing to low- and moderate- income workers, for they
show only whether an employee, at any given moment, is currently partic-
ipating in a plan. The Internal Revenue Code permits firms to sponsor plans
that provide lower levels of benefits for low- and moderate-income workers
than for other employees.' Low- and moderate-income employees, as a group,
defer a smaller percentage of their compensation to 40 1(k) plans than more
affluent employees.41 Firms are permitted to include forfeiture provisions in
36. Id. at 36 fig. 2. The statistics reflect rates for non-Hispanic whites, but the coverage
drops are similar for non-Hispanic black and ispanic populations.
37. See LR.C. § 410(bX4) (1994) (establishing exclusionary rules of age and service
requirements).
38. LR.C. § 410(b) establishes minimum participation standards for plans. A plan satisfies
those rules if it satisfies either an exclusively mathematical test, LR.C. § 410(bXl), or a more
flexible but complex test that is primarily but not exclusively mathematical, LR.C. § 410(bX2).
The latter test also requires that any classification system used to determine plan eligibility is
"reasonable and established under objective business criteria that identify the category of em-
ployee eligibleto participateunder the plan." Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-4(b) (1994).
39. See I.R.C. § 401(k) (1994) (establishing rule for cash and profit-sharing plan); LR.C.
§ 401(m) (1994) (stating non-discrimination test for matching contributions); LR.C. § 4 02(g)
(1994) (placing limitation on exclusion for elective deferrals); I.R.C. § 403(b) (1994) (defining
taxability of beneficiary).
40. See I.R.C. § 4010) (1994) (providing for integration of plans with Social Security);
Treas. Reg. § IA01(aX4)-8 (1994) (providing levels of permitted disparity for plans that do not
integrate with Social Security in form); Norman Stein & Peter Orszag, Cross-Tested Defined
Contribution Plans: A Response to Professor Zelinsky, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 629, 630 (2001) (dis-
cussing degree of permissible discrimination possible in cross-tested defined contribution plans).
41. See James M. Porterba et al, Informing Retirement-Security Reform, 401(k) Plans
and Future Patterns ofRetirement Saving, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 179, 181 (May 1998) (charting
participation in and eligibility for 401(k) plans).
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their plans for employees who have not worked at least five years. 2 Because
average job tenures decline with income level, such forfeiture provisions may
disproportionately affect low- and moderate-income workers. 3
According to one extrapolation of 1998 Social Security data, private sec-
tor pension plan benefits provide 29.8% of the retirement income for the top
quintile of income of the population above age 55; 28.1% for the second quin-
tile; 16.1% for the third quintile; 6.8% for the fourth quintile; and 3.3% for the
fift quintile.4
Thus, there are two issues that subvert the rationale for subsidizing quali-
fied plans: low- and moderate-income employees have low rates of coverage
and they earn relatively low levels of benefits when they are covered. The
two issues might be viewed collectively as one of low effective coverage, i.e.,
coverage that results in meaningful levels of benefits for low- and moderate-
income workers.
In the 1980s, Congress began a process of amending the Internal Revenue
Code to improve effective coverage by adopting new regulatory measures
designed to increase (1) the coverage rates of plans when firms choose to
sponsor them s and (2) the benefit accruals of those low- and moderate-
income plan participants.' To increase coverage rates in plans, Congress
tightened the statutory rules that mandate a minimum degree of coverageP and
42. See LR.C. § 411(aX2XA) (1994). The forfeiture conditions apply only to employer
contributions; employee contributions, whether or not elective, are immediately vested. I.R.C.
§ 411(aX1) (1994). Congress amended the Intemal Revenue Code in 2001 to provide that em-
ployer matching contributions must vestwithin thre years. IJ.C. § 411(aX12XA) (1994).
43. See JOHMA. TURNERPENSIONPOIICYFORAMOBLELABORFORCE30tb1.3.6 (1993).
It should be noted that younger workers may often be lower-paid and as a group tend to have
more kinetic employment patterns than older employees. Id at 22-23 tbl.3.3. To some extent,
then; the higher turnover rates for low-income individuals may be attributable to age rather than
income.
44. Munnell & Sunden, supra note 33, at 53 tbL7.
45. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text
46. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text
47. Prior to 1986, a plan could satisfy the minimum coverage requirements of the Internal
Revenue Code by covering 70% of all employees or 80% of the eligible employees if at least
70% of all employees were eligible to participate in the plan, permitting a plan to satify the
requirements if it covered 56% of all employees. LR.C. § 410(b) (1985). If a plan failed to
satisfy these strict mathematical tests, the employer could attempt to demonstrate to the IRS that
the plan's eligibility criteria did not, as a factual matter, discriminate in favor of officers, share-
holders, or highly-compensate employees. Id. As Professor Wolk observed, "Congressional
pension oversight committees became concerned that these tests were permitting too large a dis-
parity in the coverage percentages of highly and non-highly compensated employees and were
therefore insufficient to ensure broad, nondiscriminatory coverage of rank-and-file employees."
JoHNIL LANGaIm&BRUcA.WOIiPENSIONAND EMOYEEB 'NEFTLAW283 (3 d ed. 2000).
Under the new coverage rules, the mathematical tests compare coverage rates for the highly
compensated group and for the non-highly compensated employees group. LR.C. § 410(b)(1)
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added a new provision to the Internal Revenue Code that required every plan
to cover at least the lesser of 40% of the workforce or fifty employees.4" To
increase benefits for rank-and-file employees, Congress limited the degree to
which a plan's benefit formula could be integrated with Social Security;49
created a category of plan - the top heavy plan, in which benefits are concen-
trated in the accounts of "key employees" - that requires accelerated vesting
standards and at least a minimum benefit for all non-key employees; 0 acceler-
ated the statutory vesting standards for plans generally;" and imposed caps on
the compensation that could be considered in benefit formulas.52
We want to emphasize that during this period Congress did not create im-
portant additional incentives to encourage plan formation. Moreover, the addi-
tion of new statutory provisions to improve effective coverage came during an
era when actual coverage rates dipped somewhat, and it has been suggested that
the coverage dip was, in part, a response to the cost ofthe new regulations.53 It
also, however, has been suggested that the coverage dip occurred primarily
because ofthe severe economic downturn in the middle of the 1980s.54 In any
event, the coverage rates crept back to the 50% mark in the 1990s, possibly
attributable to the strong economy we enjoyed during that decade."5
It should also be said that it is difficult to assess whether the decline in
coverage rates had a substantive negative aggregate effect on workers in the
(1994). The latter group must have a coverage rate that is at least 70% of the former group's. Id.
If the plan does not meet the mathematical test, it must pass an alternative test - the average
benefits test- which requires that plans use a nondiscriminatory and reasonable business classi-
fication, meet a less exacting mathematical test, and meet an average benefit requirement, under
which the average benefit rate for the non-highly-compensated employees must be at least 70%
of the average benefit rate forthe highly-compensated employees. I.R.C. § 410(bX2) (1994).
48. LR.C. § 401(aX26XAXi)-(ii) (1994).
49. See generally LR.C. § 416 (1994); Nancy J. Altman, RethinkingRetirementIncome
Policies: Nondiscrimination, Integration, and the Questfor Worker Security, 42 TAX L. REV.
433 (1987).
50. LR.C. § 416 (1994).
51. For example, the ten-year forfeiture period for plans using cliff vesting was reduced
to five years, and the fifteen-year period for graded vesting was reduced to seven years. Com-
pare LM.C. § 41 1(aX1), (2) (1983) (providing for ten-year forfeiture period and fifteen-year
graded vesting) with LR1C. 411(aX1), (2) (1985) (providing for five-year forfeiture period and
seven-year graded vesting).
52. I.R.C. §401(aXl7)(1994);seeNorman Stein, Beware: TheRichAreGettingRicher;
Teforms" in the House Bill Won't Much Help Rank-And-File Workers Save for Retirement,
L.A. TIMES (op ed), July 31, 2000, at 9 (discussing how increased compensation caps could
result in reduced benefits for rank-and-file employees).
53. Robert L. Clark et al., The Effects of Pension Nondiscrimination Rules on Private
Sector Pension Participation (Sept 22, 2000), available at http:/www.brook.edu/es/events/
pension/09clark mul schieb.pdf.
54. Munnell & Sunden, supra note 33, at 7.
55. Id.
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bottom two earnings quintiles because we have no statistics on what we earlier
referred to as the effective coverage rate. We do not know, for example, how
many ofthe people who lost coverage during the 1980s were actually accruing
more than trivial benefits or whether they were vesting in the benefits they did
accrue. It seems likely that the firms most sensitive to the costs of the new
regulatory measures, and thus most likely to drop their plans in response to
tightened regulation, would have been those firms whose plans provided little
more than nominal coverage to their low- and moderate-income employees.
It is thus conceivable that the decline in nominal coverage rates was due
principally to firms dropping plans that failed to satisfy the purpose of the tax
subsidy, at least as we have defined it for purposes of this Article.
If congressional strategy during the 1980s was to tighten regulations to
improve substantive coverage for the lower income quintiles, agency regula-
tory action sometimes moved in the opposite direction. The most striking
instance occurred when the Department of Treasury (Treasury) issued regula-
tions permitting firms to establish pure cash-or-deferred plans.56 These regu-
lations interpreted 1978 legislation that added section 401(k) to the Internal
Revenue Code. In enacting § 401 (k), Congress's primary intent was to permit
firms to offer employees a choice between an end-of-the-year cash bonus or
a contribution to a profit-sharing plan,' an issue whose resolution Congress
had deferred in 1974 when it enacted ERISA. 5 (Such plans had been in
existence prior to ERISA.)59 Despite the limited purpose of the 1978 legisla-
tion, the language of § 401(k) was drafted broadly and could be read to allow
firms to permit employees to defer regular compensation, not just end-of-the-
year bonuses. Amid some level of uncertainty about whether the legislation
should be read this broadly, Treasury issued regulations that endorsed this
position.' The regulations unleashed a storm over the next two decades; the
401(k) plan became the most popular form of new qualified plan.61 The
participation rates in such plans are lower for employees in the bottom income
quintiles than for other employees in traditional employer-funded plans. 62
56. See, e.g., Jay Thomas Scholz, Pension Consultant Behind Today's Popular 401(k)
Retirem ent Plan, SAN A'roNlO Bus. I. (Mar. 9, 2001), available at http'//sanantonio.beentral.
com/sanantor/olstoriesl2OOl/03/12focus8.html (detailing history of 401(k) plan).
57. Id.
58. See DAVyDL. RAISHCASH DM M ARRANGEMENTS, TAXMANAGEMENTPORT-
FOUiO 358 (3d ed. 1997) (explaining Internal Revenue Service issuance of proposed salary
reduction regulation and ERISA moratorium).
59. Id.
60. See Scholz, supra note 56.
61. See Munnell & Sunden, supra note 33, at 15.
62. For example, according to CPS data from 1993, the participation rate for low-income
employees in traditional defined benefit plans was 83%, while the participation rate in 401(k)
plans for such employees was only 40%. See Ron Gcbhardtsbauer, Written Materials Accom-
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Similarly, Treasury proposed in 1989 and promulgated in 1991 nondis-
crimination regulations that tolerate if not encourage substantial disparities in
benefit accruals between the highly-compensated employee and the non-highly
compensated employee, particularly in smaller plans.63 At least with respect
to smaller firms, the regulations often permit the construction of plans that
maximize benefits for the highly compensated while minimizing benefits for
low- and moderate-income workers. The so-called "cross-testing rules,"64
permitting some firms to establish defined contribution plans in which the most
highly compensated employees receive annual account allocations that are
more than twenty times the allocations provided for lower-paid employees,
have been the most visible and controversial part of the regulations enabling
firms to effect such goals.65
It is difficult to assess the net effect of the legislative and regulatory
modifications of the nondiscrimination rules during the 1980s, but our sense
is that these opposing forces probably left the overall effective coverage rate
for the lower two quintiles about where it was at the beginning of the 1980s,
despite the congressional agenda to improve benefits for low- and moderate-
income workers. Had the regulatory agenda been consistent with congressio-
nal policy decisions, it is possible that the level of effective coverage would
have increased even though the nominal coverage levels may have declined.
The congressional climate changed dramatically in the 1990s. Congress
shifted its focus from improving benefit adequacy for the low- and moderate-
income employee to broadening the opportunities for affluent plan participants
to save on a tax-deferred basis and making plan sponsorship more attractive
to firms that did not sponsor plans. Increasing the amount that affluent partic-
ipants can contribute to qualified plans does not directly effect benefit ade-
quacy for low- and moderate-income employees, although it does come with
a high tax-expenditure price tag and does not reflect a concern with increasing
retirement adequacy for such employees.' The approach that Congress has
panying Testimony Before ERISAAdvisory Council, July 17, 2001, at 3 (on file with Washing-
ton and Lee Law Review).
63. Tress. Reg. § 1.A01-(aX4) (1994). See generalsy Peter A. Christensen & Marjorie
Martin, A Complete Guide to Age-Weighted Defined Contribution Plans, in 1 PENSION AND
PROFiT SHARING 2D, No. 42,15 (1992).
64. See Tress. Reg. § 1.01(aX4)-8 (1994) (providing rules for cross-testing); Stein &
Orszag, supra note 40, at 630 (providing similar illustrations and arguing that cross-tested plans
should be limited); Edward A. Zclinsky, Is Cross-Testing a Mistake? Cash Balance Plans, New
ComparabilityFormulas and theIncoherence ofthe Nondiscrimination Norm, 49 BUFF.L. REV.
575 (2001) (providing illustrations of how cross-testing works and defending cross-tested plans);
Edward A. Zelinsky, Cross-Testing, Nondiscrimination, and New Comparability: A Rejoinder
to Mr. Orszag and Professor Stein, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 675 (2001).
65. Stein & Orszag, supra note 40, at 643.
66. For example, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the pension legislation
that President Clinton vetoed in 2000 would have carried a tax cost of $16.1 billion. 27 Pens.
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crafted to cajole new plan sponsorship, however, will likely have the effect of
reducing benefit adequacy for low- and moderate-income workers because the
approach is one of reduced regulation.'
Congressman Benjamin Cardin, an architect of this approach, wrote a
legislative package, now largely enacted, that he helped design, with the goal
that
HR 10 will help extendthe oppdrtunityfortax-favoredretirement savings
for workers in smallbusinesses. To date, only a small proportion of small
businesses have set up retirement savings plans for their workers.
Among companies with fewer than 100 employees, 80% of the work-
force has no pension or retirement plan. Compared to large companies,
where 75% ofthe work force has a retirement plan, this demonstrates the
urgent need to make it easier for small businesses to set up retirement
savings plans. H.R. 10 will remove burdensome regulations that have
made it difficult for small businesses to give their workers the opportunity
to save for retirement.6
Burdensome regulations make a convenient windmill for any brave legislative
knight. Indeed, everyone can agree that regulations should be simplified when
a regulatory burden is generated by complexity alone, i.e., when plan sponsors
have to pay consultants to decipher the meaning of a regulation's requirement
or to determine whether they are in regulatory compliance ("first, let's pay all
the lawyers"). But the regulations that Congress recently eliminated or soft-
ened did not impose complexity burdens of this variety. The burdens they
imposed were simply the financial costs of providing nontrivial levels of
benefits for low- and moderate-income employees.
Congress first loosened such regulations when it created safe-harbor
401(k) plans and the similar SIMPLE plan in 1996 legislation.69 In traditional
401(k) plans, employers must undergo an annual testing procedure designed
to ensure that utilization of the plan by a firm's non-highly compensated
employees bears a nontrivial relationship to utilization by highly compensated
employees.7" The testing process, and correction process if the plan fails to
& Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1669 (1980). The amendments to the pension tax provisions embodied in
this legislation were ultimately rolled into the Economic Cnuwth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001.
67. See, e.g., Benjamin L. Cardin, Pension Bill WillAllow Greater SavingforRetirement,
at http'/wwwhouse.gov/cardin/published articles/PENSIONREFORM WILL ALLOW
GREATER_SAVINGS_FOR_RETIREMENT.htm (stating that pension reform embodied in
HR 10 will allow greater savings for retirement).
68. Id.
69. Small Business Job ProtectionAct of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188, § 1421,110 Stat 1795.
70. See I.R-C. § 401(kX3) (1994) (describing standards for application of participation
and discrimination).
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satisfy the testing, impose administrative burdens on the sponsoring firm, but
a firm may design its plan and procedures to simplify these processes.7
The 1996 legislation permitted employers to eschew the testing process
if the plan design provides that the employer will make matching contribu-
tions for the employee equal to 100% of the first 3% of compensation that the
employee voluntarily contributes to the plan, and equal to 50% ofthe next 2%
of compensation. 2 For small employers, the same legislation created SIM-
PLE, where the plan satisfies the nondiscrimination rules if it provides a
match for onlythe first 3% of compensation.73 These types of plans are easier
to administer than traditional 401(k) plans, but the result will be smaller
benefits for low- and moderate-income employees in many plans.
The rationale for these safe-harbor nondiscrimination requirements is that
they reduce regulation without reducing benefits because empirically we know
that employees at all income levels respond to employer matches in traditional
401(k) plans.74 But the matching requirements, which permit the employer to
condition ultimate receipt of the match on three years of vesting service, were
arbitrarily selected without empirical verification that the matches would be
adequate to stimulate employee contributions.
It is more problematic that these plans alter firm incentives that might
result in a less vigorous employee response to matches in these new plans than
to matches in traditional 401(k) plans. In traditional 401(k) plans, firms have
an interest in encouraging significant levels of plan participation by non-
highly-compensated employees so that highly-compensated employees can
maximize their contributions under the special 401(k) nondiscrimination test-
ing rules. Firms sponsoring SIMPLE and safe-harbor 401(k) plans lack such
incentive. Indeed, the incentives run in the direction of discouraging plan
participation by nonhighly-compensated employees, sparing the firm the bur-
den of making the matching contributions for them. Thus, there is reason to
believe that the net effect may be plans that provide less saving for non-highly
compensated employees than do traditional 401(k) plans.
71. See RAISI, supra note 58, at 27-29 (exploring various methods employers have at
their disposal to ensure compliance wth 401(kX3) tests).
72. LR.C. § 401(kX12)(B) (1994). As an alternative, the employer can make 3% non-
elective contributions on behalf of all plan participants. LR.C. § 401(kX12XC) (1994).
73. LR.C. § 401(kXl )(BXiXI) (Supp. V 1999). As an alternativethe employer can make
2% of nonelective contributions on behalf of all plan participants. R.C. § 401(kXl l)(BXi)
(Supp. V 1999).
74. See, e.g., Social Security: Budgetary Tradeoffs and Transition Costs, 107th Cong.
34 (2001) (testimony of Sylvester I. Shieber) (noting that based on survey of 401(k) plans,
approximately 90% of employees earning more than $35,000 participated in 401(k) plan
offering 100% matching contribution and that 75% of employees earning between $25,000 and
$35,000 participated).
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If the effect were only to induce some firms that do not have plans to
adopt new plans, the overall effect on retirement savings for moderate-income
employees would, of course, be positive, even if small. The issue then would
be simply whether the additional coverage was worth the tax cost ofthese new
plans. But when Congress created these new types of plans, it also encour-
aged firms with traditional 401(k) plans and firms with employer-funded
retirement plans to consider substituting a SIMPLE or safe-harbor 401(k) plan
for their existing plan. If firms do this, an actual decline in the retirement
savings of their moderate-income employees might occur. In order for the
aggregate effect on moderate-income employees to be positive, the number of
employees who were not covered by any plan prior to their firm's adoption of
a SIMPLE or safe-harbor 40 1(k) would have to exceed the number of employ-
ees who save less as a result of their firms replacing an existing plan with a
SIMPLE or safe-harbor 401(k) plan.
There is some reason to believe that negative effects - lost savings - may
predominate. First, most firms that do not sponsor plans say they lack suffi-
cient business profit to justify adopting a plan." Firms in which business
profits are low typically will not have any highly-compensated employees.
These firms were within an effective safe harbor before the introduction of the
SIMPLE and safe-harbor 40 1(k) plan because plans with no highly compen-
sated employees automatically pass nondiscrimination testing. The SIMPLE
and safe-harbor 401(k) plans add little to the mix of incentives for such firms.
Second, the recently enacted Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001 (EGTRA) increases the amounts that employers and employees
can contribute to SIMPLE and safe-harbor 401(k) plans, making them attrac-
tive to a wider range of firms already sponsoring these plans.76
EGTRA also increases the deductibility limits for individual retirement
plans to $5,000, providing some small business owners with an alternative to
adoption of a qualified plan that requires them to provide some benefits to
their employees. 7
7
EGTRA also includes several provisions that allow firms to design their
plans with lower levels of benefits for low- and moderate-income employees
than the Internal Revenue Code permitted pre-EGTRA. Section 416 of the
Internal Revenue Code, for example, mandates that "top-heavy" plans - plans
75. EBRI SuRvEY, supra note 32.
76. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 611 (f), 115 Stat. 38,99 (2001) [hereinafter EGTRA]. EGTRA amends I.R.C. §§ 401(kX1 1)
and 408(p) and increases the maximum SIMPLE elective contributions from $6,000 to $10,000,
although the increase is phased in $1,000 increments through 2005. Id. EGTRA increased the
overall limits for 401(k) plans, including safe harbor 401(k) plans, from $10,500 to $15,000,
although the increase again is phased in through 2006. EGTRA § 61 1(dXl) (2001) (amending
I.R.C. § 402(gXl)).
77. EGTRA § 601(aX2)(2001)(amendingLR.C. § 219(bX5)).
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in which "key employees" have accumulated 60% or more of the aggregate
benefits under the plan - must provide accelerated vesting and a minimum
benefit for each plan participant.78 For defined contribution plans, the mini-
mum benefit is generally equal to 3% of a participant's compensation.79 In
many 401 (k) plans and in so-called "new comparability" plans, the sole reason
that mostnon-highly paid employees are accumulating even a marginally mean-
ingful benefit is this minimum contribution rule.s Onnew comparability plans,
key employees may be receiving benefits in excess of 20% oftheir compensa-
tion."1) EGTRA makes several definitional changes that will reduce the
number of plans that must provide minimum benefits to non-key employees.'
It also permits top-heavy plans to credit employer matching contributions
toward the minimum benefit requirement.s
Although critics of the top-heavy rules complain about the complexity
of annually determining top-heavy status," this complexity can be avoided
entirely ifthe plan provides for three-year vesting and minimum contributions
equal to 3% of compensation. Thus, to a considerable extent, the complexity
created by the top-heavy rules is voluntary on the part of plan sponsors. More-
over, when Congress asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to study
top-heavy plans, the resulting report found that few plans experienced sub-
stantial cost or difficulty in coping with the top-heavy rules."' Congress
ignored the GAO's findings when passing EGTRA. Because of the changes
in the top-heavy rules, participants in some existing small plans will find their
future benefits reduced, sometimes substantially.
78. IlRC. § 416(b), (c) (1994).
79. Id. § 416(cX2) (1994).
80. See U.S. GEN.ACCOUNTING OFFCE, "TOP HEAVY" RULES FOROWNER-DOMINATED
PLANS (GAD/HEHS-00-141),REPORT TOTHECHAMAN, SPECIALCOMMnTONAANG,U.S.
SENATE 13-15 (2000) [hereinafter REPORT ON "ToP HEAVY RULES"] (discussing minimum re-
quired employer contribution for workers in top-heavy defined contribution plans).
81. a See generally Stein & Orszag, supra note 40.
82. EGTRA § 613(a) (2001) (amending LR.C. § 416(X1XA)); EGTRA, § 613(CX1)
(2001) (amending 11C. § 416(g)).
83. EGTRA § 613(b) (2001).
84. See, e.g.,ASS'NOFPRIVATPENSION&WELFAREPLANS,SUMMARYANDHIG GHS
oFH.R. 1 102,T ECOMPRENSvERETmeNTSEcu rTYANDPENSIONREFORMAcTOFI999
("The repeal or significant modification of the top-heavy rules has been an important APPWP
priority since the rules' inception. The top-heavy rules have been viewed as a strong disincen-
tive to plan formation by small employers.... The simplifications to the top-heavy rules
contained in H.R. 1102, several of which APPWP developed, should encourage small employ-
ers to adopt plans and will eliminate an administrative burden for large employers.").
85. SeeREPORTON"TOPH.AVY" RUIP.S,supra note 80, at29-30 (findingthatadministm-
tive costs to ensure compliance with top-heavy rules generally appear to be minor part of em-
ployer's total administrative costs to operate tax-qualified plan).
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EGTRA weakened another Internal Revenue Code provision - the com-
pensation cap - which is designed to increase benefits for all but the highest
paid employees.8 6 The compensation cap limits the amount of compensation
that an employer may consider in a plan's benefit formula. The effect of the
compensation cap generally comes from the intersection between a plan's
benefit formula and the dollar limits that Internal Revenue Code § 415 im-
poses on contributions and benefits.' Before EGTRA, the statute set the com-
pensation cap at $150,000 with adjustments for cost of living increases.s In
the year 2000, the inflation-adjusted index reached $170,000.9
In 2000, a firm could contribute a maximum amount of $30,000 to a
defined contributionplan.9  Assume that a firm's owner had $200,000 in com-
pensation and that the firm's owner wanted the maximum $30,000 contribu-
tion to his account. Also assume, for purposes of simplicity, that the Internal
Revenue Code required the firm to contribute the same percentage of compen-
sation for each plan participant.91 Because the compensation cap forces the
plan to treat the firm owner as if he were earning $170,000, the plan would
have to use a 17.65% contribution rate for all participants in order to provide
the owner $30,000.
EGTRA boosted the compensation cap to $200,000.' 3 Applying the
new compensation cap to the above facts, the firm could reduce the contribu-
tion rate to 15% and still provide the owner with $30,000. The only effect of
86. I.R.C. § 401(aX17) (1994).
87. Before EGTRA, § 415(b) limited a normal retirement life annuity under a defined
benefit plan to $120,000, which by the year 2001 had been adjusted to $140,000 to reflect cost-
of-living increases. Section 415(c) limited annual allocations under a defined contribution plan
to $30,000, which in the year 2000 had been adjusted to $35,000 to reflect cost-of-living
increases. The interaction between the compensation cap and § 415, inthe context of a defined
contribution plan, is described in the text accompanying infra notes 90-92.
88. LR.C. § 401(aX17) (1994).
89. LR.S. Notice 2000-66,2000-52 C. 600.
90. LR c. § 415(c) (2000).
91. The Internal Revenue Code's nondiscrimination rules nominally require that benefits
or contributions are proportionately the same on a compensation basis for highly and non-highly
compensated employees. See LR.C. § 401(aX5) (1994). The proportionality norm, however,
is a weak one, and an employer may - through Social Security integration, see LR.C. § 401(1)
(1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(aX4)-6 (as amended in 1998), through age-weighting, see Treas.
Reg. § 1.401 (aX4)-8 (as amended in 1993); Stein & Orszag, supra note 40, and through other
methods, see Stein & Orszag, supra note 40 - provide benefits for highly compensated em-
ployees that bear a higher percentage to their pay than benefits for rank-and-file employees bear
to their pay. However, generally speaking, a benefit that reflects a higher percentage of pay for
highly-paid employees will increase benefits for rank-and-file employees as well.
92. This again assumes that benefits will bear the same relationship to pay for both highly-
compensated and rank-and-file employees.
93. EGTRA § 611(c) (2001) (amending I.R.C. § 401(aX17)).
1386
PROBLEMS WrTH THE PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM 17
this would be to reduce the contributions to the other plan participants to15%.94
EGTRA made other changes that will permit or encourage some existing
plans to reduce benefits for low- and moderate-income employees.95 Realisti-
cally, none of these changes are likely to result in substantial new plan sponsor-
ship. To the extent that the changes do encourage the formation of new plans
by lowering the amount of benefits that plans must provide to low- and moder-
ate-income employees, those plans will provide lower levels of benefits to such
employees than the Internal Revenue Code has required previously. Moreover,
another likely effect ofthese EGTRA changes will be the reduction of benefits
for low- and moderate-income employees in many already-existing plans.
The only provision aimed directly at helping low- and moderate-income
workers is a government matching credit for certain lower-income individuals
who elect to contribute to an employer cash or deferral plan or to an individual
retirement account.9 The maximum credit is 50% of the amount contributed
(up to $2,000 per person or $4,000 for married couples), which applies to
individuals with $15,000 or less in adjusted gross income.Y The credit then
drops to 20% for individuals with income over $15,000 but less than $16,250,
and then drops to 10% for those with up to $25,000 of income.'
There are a number of reasons why the credit is not likely to contribute
significantly to the retirement security of those to whom it is aimed. First, the
credit is nonrefundable. 9 The child care and dependent care credits, which can
reduce to zero the taxes paid by some families whose adjusted gross income is
less than $15,000, will cause some otherwise eligible taxpayers to derive no
benefit from the credit."W Moreover, the $1,000 maximum credit nominally
available under the statute is probably not actually available to any taxpayer
94. The effect could be substantial. For an employee with $50,000 in compensation, the
decrease in contributions for the year would be $1,000. Assuming that the employee is age
thirty-five, continues to participate in the plan, and earns $50,000 each year until he retires at
age sixty-five, the employee's loss in retirement income would exceed $100,000 at age sixty-
five, assuming an 8% rate of return.
95. For example, safe-harbor 401(k) plans under ILR.C. § 401(kX12) will no longer be
subject to the top-heavy provisions. EGTRA § 416(gX4X-) (2001). EGTRA also permits
employees over age fifty to make $5,000 elective contributions (which Congress calls "catch-
up" contributions), which are not subject to nondiscrimination utilization testing. In some firms
in which owner employees over age fifty do not wish to make the maximum permitted contribu-
tion to a defined contribution plan, the firm could reduce firm contributions for all employees
and the higher paid employees could make up the difference through these additional elective
contributions.
96. EGTRA § 618(a) (2001) (adding § 25B to Internal Revenue Code).
97. LR.C. § 25B(b) (2001).
98. Id.
99. Id. § 25B(h) (2000).
100. IRS. Announcement 2001-106, 2001-44 LRB. 1.
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after 2002 because the taxpayer must have no more than $15,000 in adjusted
gross income to be eligible for the 50% credit, and the maximum possible tax
liability for such a taxpayer is $970." 1 This will generally be lower because of
dependency deductions and tax credits.3 2 Second, the income thresholds are
not indexed to inflation, a stark departure from almost every other retirement
plan limit in the Internal Revenue Code."° Third, the credit declines to 20%
once a taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds $15,000 and to 10% once his
income exceeds $16,250.1 4 It is questionable whether a credit of 10% or even
20% will be sufficient to motivate low-income workers to save for retirement.
Fourth, unless it is renewed, the credit will be available for only five years. 5
Finally, Congress designed the credit in apparent ignorance ofthe work of be-
havioral economists, whose research suggests that workers avoid savings pro-
grams inwhichtheir paycheck declines. 6 Such behavior may be the perceived
effect under a credit in which people must make voluntary deferrals to an em-
ployer plan."° Many people in the income range eligible for the credit will not
have sufficient sums ofmoneyto make an end-of-the-year IRA deposit to quali-
fy for the credit. It also may be unrealistic to believe that potential recipients of
the credit will make small weekly IRA deposits. In our view, the most likely
effect of the credit will be to reduce slightly the taxes of low- and moderate-
income people who are already saving in their employer's 401(k) plan. The
credit also may attract a few recent college graduates in their first half-year in
the workforce, when their income may reflect only a partial calendar year of
full-time earning. In ourview, it is improbable that the credit will create signifi-
cant new stores of retirement savings for the people it purportedlytargets.
101. In 2002, the marginal tax rate on the first $6,000 of taxable income will be 10%, and
the rate on taxable income then rises to 15% for all income over $6,000. Assume now there is
a single taxpayer with $15,000 in adjusted gross income who takes the standard deduction and
one exemption deduction. If we assume that the standard deduction and exemption amount for
the year 2000 ($4,400 and $2,800) remains unchanged - and it will of course be adjusted up-
wards to reflect increases in the cost of living - the taxpayer's taxable income will be $7,800
and the tax liability (and maximum credit) would be $970.
102. If the taxpayer from the previous footnote had a dependent child and did not take the
child or dependent care credit, her taxable income would be reduced to $5,000, and her tax
liability (and maximum credit) would be $500.
103. Compare, e.g., LR.C. § 25B(b) (2001) with LR.C. §§ 219(bX5XC), 401(aX17)(B),
402(gX4), 408(pX2)(EXii), 415(d) (2001).
104. I.R.C. § 25B(b) (2001).
105. Id. § 25B(g) (2001).
106. RICHARD H. TBALER, T-I WINNER's CuRSE 76 (1992); Richard IL Thaler& Shlomo
Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving
(Nov. 2000), available at httpY/economics.uchicago.edu/downloadlsave-more.pdf.
107. See, e.g., Eldar Shafiretal.,Moneylllusion, 112 Q. J. EcON.341 (1997) (contending
that money illusion - tendency to think in terms of nominal rather than real monetary values -
is widespread phenomenon in United States today).
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The legislative decisions reflected in recent pension legislation mark a
retreat from the traditional carrot/stick blueprint for the tax treatment of quali-
fied plans, that of encouraging plan sponsorship through tax incentives for the
highly-paid and of forcing plans to provide the social benefit of retirement
savings for lower-paid employees through regulation. As Professor Bruce
Wolk explained in 1982:
As the discrimination rules require more inthe way ofcontnbutions for
lower paid employees, the employer's costs increase. For any given em-
ployer, the costs may eventually exceed the benefits of covering the highly
paid employees. At that point, the employer would decline to establish or
continuearetirementplan. Thus, anaggressive congressional stance against
discriminationmight effecivelypreclude many lowerpaid employees from
receiving retirement benefits....
Congress could avoid the adverse effect of aggressive discrimination
rules by designing rules to ensure a high level oftax subsidy in relation to
employer costs. Presumably this would result in a larger number of em-
ployers establishing ornaintainingplans. Rulesbringing aboutthis result,
however, would risk wasting the tax subsidy. To the extent that such rules
would encourage employers to establish plans by excluding lower paid
employees, the subsidy would be applied ineffectively.
From Congress's perspective, the optimum level of tax subsidy is that
which encourages the establishment of a retirement plan only if the social
benefit of the plan equals or exceeds its costs."
Congress has moved in the direction of higher subsidies for the highly
paid and of less regulation - sweetening the carrot and softening the stick.109
As Dan Halperin has noted, this will result in more but worse plans."1 Ifthe
only result were the addition of new plans, the only problem would be cost:
are we getting enough social benefit given the tax costs of such new plans?
Because of the softening of regulations, however, a reduction of benefits for
lower-paid employees in existing plans also will result.
Perhaps this suggests a paradigmatic shift in our understanding ofthe tax
subsidy for qualified plans away from the provision of retirement savings for
low- and moderate-income workers who otherwise would undersave for retire-
ment. Perhaps the emerging understanding of the tax subsidy for qualified
plans is that the subsidy should simply increase our overall national savings
rate without regard to whether it helps low- and moderate-income people save
108. Wolk, supra note 10, at433.
109. EGTRA, for example, increased the limitations for both defined benefit and defined
contribution plans under LR.C. § 415. See EGTRA § 611 (2001). We have already described
some of EGTRA's regulation softening. See supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text
110. Halperin, supra note 9, at 164 (noting that under current scheme of incentives, there
is always choice between fewer but better plans or less satisfactory arrangements in greater
number).
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for retirement. Another possible explanation for the qualified plan tax subsidy
is that it introduces a consumption tax element into our tax system, providing
a partial balance to the perceived bias of an income tax against savings.' A
third possibility, although one that by its nature cannot be explicitly acknowl-
edged in political discourse, is that the qualified plan subsidy is designed to
indirectly provide a reduction in the effective tax rates of relatively high-
income taxpayers. This explanation assumes that providing the reduction
indirectly through qualified plans accords political cover to what could not be
legislated directly. Finally, one might argue that the tax subsidy primarily is
intended to increase retirement savings for the upper strata of the middle class.
The plan participation rate for the upper-income band of the middle class is
high (approximately 80%), and it is reasonable to think that some if not most
of the high utilization is the tax subsidy embedded in qualified retirement
plans.
We accept that the alternative explanations for the subsidy outlined above
already play some role in the political sustainability ofthe qualified plan sub-
sidy. But one of the explanations - the idea that the subsidy simply provides
a tax rate reduction - is seldom acknowledged, and for the past forty years,
none ofthe alternative explanations have been nearly as instrumentalto the dis-
cussion as what we have sometimes called the qualified plan paradigm. This
explanation has been the most important for the past forty years in shaping the
intellectual and rhetorical landscape that provides the tax subsidy its public
justificatory context. 12 Indeed, the qualified planparadiginis so dominant that
the sponsors and supporters of recent pension legislation argue that such pro-
posals are consistent with this paradigm, even though the proposals could be
justified more easily under one or more ofthe other explanations." 3
This argument points to the heart of an important concern: the debate
over retirement security is distorted. By arguing that their pension "reforms"
will expand coverage and enrich benefits for low- and moderate-income work-
111. See RIcHA!D IPPOIrO,ANECONOMCAPPRAMALOFPENSION TAX Po1C '2 (1990)
(arguing that federal rules governing pensions represent means of enforcing statutory marginal
income tax rates because without special tax treatment of pension trust funds, marginal tax rates
would increase by order of magnitude for earnings set aside for retirement consumption).
112. See Stein, supra note 21, at 195-96 (describing hypothesis of qualified plan para-
digm).
113. See AM. CouNCIL OF LIFE INS., PoRTMAN-CARDIN: APENsIONREFORmBILLFoI
SmAiL BusuNs AND WoMEN (2001), available at http'J/www.aclLcom/public/media/pubs/
portman-cardin.pdf (last visited Jan. 18,2002); Cardin, supra note 67; Press Release, The Profit
Sharing Council of America, PSCA Urges Inclusion of Portman/Cardin in Tax Relief Package
(Feb. 13, 2001), available at http/www.psca.org/pressfp20O1/feb13.html ("[T]hese reforms
also will result in expanded coverage in the small business sector, which employs a dispropor-
tionate share of lower-income and female workers. It also will remove barriers to progressive
businesses that want to make significant profit-sharing contributions to their employee's retire-
ment accounts.").
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ers and thus are consistent with the traditional qualified plan paradigm, the
congressional champions of EGTRA close off serious consideration of other
measures that might in fact have expanded coverage and enriched retirement
benefits for these workers. Ifinstead they had sought tojustify their proposals
on the basis of one of the alternatives for the qualified plan subsidy, we might
have expected two positive political outcomes: explicit discussion ofthemerits
and costs of their suggested justification (whatever it might be), and consider-
ation of proposals to help low- and moderate-income workers build retirement
security apart from the universe of employer-sponsored plans. Inevitably, the
latter consideration should include proposals to modify Social Security in this
direction
I. The Problems ofLinkage
Certainty and understanding are virtues in a retirement program whether
or not it is designed to provide an old age or disability pension, and whether
or not the program provides income replacement or in-kind benefits, such as
medical benefits. Participants who do not understand what they are promised,
or who cannot rely with certainty on the promises made, may reach a time of
dependency with inadequate resources - a time when it is too late to make
alternative arrangements. This Part of the Article considers this idea of link-
age between employee understanding of a plan's benefit and the employee's
ultimate receipt of the expected benefit.
The problems of linkage occur when participants believe employers are
promising something different from that for which they have an enforceable
contractual right. Despite the goal of the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974 (ERISA) of ensuring the certainty of the benefit promise,
the problems of linkage continue to be a fixture in the retirement benefits
landscape. This Part ofthe Article reviews some linkage problems that haunt
participants in private pension plans.
Before considering those problems, however, we want to observe that the
increased linkage of the expected and actual retirement benefit comes with a
price: it restricts employer flembility, which could result in fewer plans
and/or lower benefits in a voluntary system such as ours, in which neither plan
sponsorship or plan design is mandated. Thus, we approach the issue of
imperfect linkage less as a critique of our current private system than as a fact
whose effects on employee retirement security should inform the Social
Security debate. 14
114. However, many believe the system can provide better protections for employee benefit
expectations. See generally Jay Conison, Suitsfor Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U. PmTr. L. REV.
1 (1992); Dana M Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise?, 81 IOWA
L. REV. 1 (1995); Norman P. Stein, ERISA and the Limits of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (1993).
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A. The Reservation of Rights Clause and Retiree Health
Competently designed employee benefits plans generally include a waiver
of rights clause under which the sponsoring fir can modify or terminate the
plan at any time. Such clauses sometimes begin with strong endorsements of
the plan and then disavow any obligation to employees to continue to maintain
the plan. For example, General Motors' retiree health plan included the fol-
lowing language:
GenerlMotors beieves wholeheartedlyinthis Insurance Programfor GM
men and women, and expects to continue the Program indefinitely. How-
ever, GM reserves the right to modify, revoke, suspend, terminate, or
change the Program, in whole or in part, at any time."5
A law review note written in 1940 referred to such clauses as weasel clauses.1 16
Federal courts often have held that such clauses are enforceable, despite
employer conduct suggesting that a plan was permanent and could not be
modified or terminated.' A Sixth Circuit case involving the General Motors
clause quoted above is typical."' General Motors distributed numerous plan
descriptions over the years, some of which included reservation of rights
language, but the majority of which did not.119 The plan's description included
language promising lifetime benefits: for example, "[y]our basic health care
115. Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 338,394 (6th Cir. 1998).
116. See Note, LegalStatus ofPrivate IndustrialPension Plans, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1375,
1379(1940). A list of weasel clauses can be found in LUTHER CONANTA CRmcALANLYsis
oF INDUST PENSION SYSTEMS 79 (1922). See also ARTHUR D. CLOUD, PENSIONS IN
MODERN INDUSTRY 131-33,186-204 (1930) (discussing reservation of fights clauses).
117. See, e.g., Sprague, 133 F.3d at 394 (holding that because employer's summary plan
descriptions unambiguously reserved right to amend plan, acceptance statements signed by
retirees or written representations provided by employer did not supersede or modify plan); In
re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 58 F.3d 896,907 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding
that while retirees may have relied to their detriment on their interpretation of summary plan
descriptions as promising vested or lifetime benefits, unambiguous descriptions applied to such
benefits); Moore v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488,492 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that absent
showing tantamount to proof of fraud, ERISA welfare plan is not subject to amendment as result
of informal communications between employer and plan beneficiaries). There are, however,
cases to the contrary. See, e.g., Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co., 217 F.3d 539, 547 (7th Cir.
2000) (holding that collective bargaining agreement between employer and union contained
latent ambiguity and thus retired employees rebutted presumption that their health benefits would
not continue beyond collective bargaining agreement duration); United Steelworkers v. Connors
Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499, 1505 (1 th Cir. 1988) (affirming trial court decision that language in
insurance agreement obliged employer to provide insurance benefits after expiration of negoti-
ated labor contracts). These cases are generally based on interpretations of collective bargaining
agreements. See generally Catherine L. FiskLochnerRedux TheRenaissance ofLaissez-Faire
Contract in the Federal Common Law ofEmployee Benefits, 56 OHIo ST. L.J. 153 (1995).
118. Sprague, 133 F3d at394.
119. Id. at409 (Martin, C.S., dissenting).
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coverages will be provided at GM's expense for your lifetime.'M20 Moreover,
a large group of the retirees who retired under special early retirement pro-
grams also received additional oral and written communications promising
them retiree medical care.121 Many of them signed early retirement contracts
after receiving a description of their retirement benefits that included the
continuation of health care coverage at no cost to them.12 Finally, according
to a lawyer for the participants, a long history of uninterrupted free retiree
health care, continuous improvements in such health care, and a corporate
ethos and employee culture of which retiree benefits were an important part,
all reinforced the employee belief that the rights were permanent.123
In 1987, more than a quarter century after General Motors adopted the
plan, it modified the health care plan in ways that substantially increased
retiree costs and decreased plan benefits.124 A group of retirees brought a civil
action against General Motors and prevailed in district court with a decision
in favor of the early retirees who had waived other rights for a package that
120. Id.
121. Id. at 412-13. For example, GM personnel workers told some early retires that the
retirees "would get their basic health insurance for the rest of their life fre .... We told
everybody that." Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 843 F. Supp. 266, 283 (E.D. Mich. 1994),
affid, 92 F.3d 1425 (6th Cir. 1996), rehearing granted &judgment vacated by 102 F.3d 204
(6th Cir. 1996) and 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998). Other retirees were told that "they would
continue to receive the same health care program they had as employees as long as they lived,
at no cost to them." Id. at 284; see also Sengpiel v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 970 F. Supp. 1322,
1326 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (noting release that employees signed in favor of employer expressly
stated "I hereby release and forever discharge the Company from any other obligations under
its present or future Employee Benefits Program except for payments of future premiums on my
adjusted Group Life Insurance and payment of Hospitalization Program benefits to the extent
described in applicable programs"), aftd, 156 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 1998).
122. Sprague, 843 F. Supp. at 308.
123. Telephone Interview with Christopher MacKaronis, attorney for Sprague plaintiffs
(July 2001). There was also trial testimony to this effect from a former Director of Health Care
for General Motors, who when asked about the reservation-of-rights clause found in some of
the benefit summaries, stated:
[I]f you look at and think about the culture that existed within General Motors over
those years during which employees were repeatedly told that these coverages
would be continued for life, and so when there's an admonition that there may be
modifications or changes, I think that - that reading has to do with the past experi-
ence that we've had of making some changes. Those changes were always im-
provements. There was not an admonition that - that this program can be drasti-
cally reduced or eliminated.
Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 843 F. Supp. 266, 304-05 (ED. Mich. 1994), aff'd, 92 F.3d
1425 (6th Cir. 1996), rehearing granted &judgment vacated by 102 F.3d 204 (6th Cir. 1996)
and 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998).
124. Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp, 133 F.3d 388,395 (6th Cir. 1998). The costs shifted
to retirees were in the form of an annual deductible and an imposition of a co-pay, the maximum
impact on a retiree with family coverage was $750 annually. IR
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they believed included retiree health benefits. But the Sixth Circuit reversed
in part and instead held that the reservation of rights clause trumped all other
representations and expectations because it was part of the written plan docu-
ment. The Sixth Circuit noted:
ERISA "has an elaborate scheme inplaceforbeneficiaries tolearntheir
rights and obligations at any time, a scheme thatisbuilt around reliance on
the face of written plan documents." To implement this scheme, ERISA
requires that every plan "shall be established and maintaine pursuant to
awritteninstrument," 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). ERISAalsorequires, aswe
have said, a written summary plan description that will "reasonably ap-
prise ... participants and beneficiaries oftheirrights and obligations under
the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a).
The writing requirement ensures that "every employee may, on examin-
ig the plan documents, determine exactly what his rights and obligations
areundertheplan." Andtherequirementlendspredictabilityandcertainty
to employee benefit plans. This serves the interests ofboth employers and
employees. "Congressintendedthatplandocuments and SPDs exclusively
governanemployer's obligationsunderERISAplans." We recognize that
"Ithis may not be a foolproof informational scheme, although it is quite
thorough. Either way, it is the scheme that Congress devised."
Our court has consistently refused to recognize oral modifications to
writtenplan documents. "[W]e are quite certain," we have explained, "that
Congress, in passing ERISA, did not intend that participants in employee
benefit plans should be left to the uncertainties of oral communications in
finding outpreciselywhat rights they were givenundertheirplano" There-
fore, the "clear terms of a written employee benefit plan may not be modi-
fled or superseded by oral undertakings on the part of the employer."12
However, the rarefied world conjured into being through judicial magic
is not the world inhabited by most employees, whom employers generally
condition to accept representations made by supervisory personnel. The legal
distinction between a provision in the written plan document and an oral
representation or written representation made outside the plan document is not
one with which a typical employee is likely to be familiar. Moreover, employ-
ees generally learn best through a combination of sources, including oral and
written communication from supervisors. 26 To privilege the formal plan
125. Id. at 402-03 (citations omitted). The court also concluded that estoppel theories were
unavailing, given the existence of the reservation of rights clauses. Id. at 404; see also Int'l
Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Skinner Engine Co.,
188 F.3d 130, 152 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that failure to distribute summary plan descriptions
with reservation of rights clause did not give rise to estoppel because employer did not have
fraudulent intent and no other extraordinary circumstances were present).
126. See generally VICTOR S. BAROCAS, BINEFIT COMMUNICATIONS: ENHANCING THE
EMPLOYER'S NVEsTMENT 15,31-37 (1993); MIcHAEL BLAND, EMPLOYEE COMMuNIeATIONs
1394
PROBLEMS W7TH THE PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM
document over other forms of communication contradicts basic behavioral
rules governing communication in the workplace."2
Reservation-of-rights clauses, even when employees are aware of them
and understand that a firm might exercise its rights thereunder, create prob-
lems of certainty for employees trying to plan for their retirement security.
When such clauses exist, employees cannot depend on employer-provided
health benefits still being available by the time they retire, and they cannot
depend on their indefinite continuation after they retire. Rational employees
would make other arrangements for health care before they retire because once
they retire their fixed financial resources will constrain their ability to engagein other arrangements. 128 Employees who respond in this manner would
probably attach little or no value to the employer's suggestion that it will
provide its retirees with health care. Receipt of such benefits, then, might be
regarded by lucky retired employees as a windfall. In such an environment, a
firm probably would not make such quasi-promises to its employees.
B. The Implicit Bargain in Defined Benefit Plans
In traditional defined benefit plans, benefits are backloaded, that is, the
present value of the annual benefit accrual increases geometrically in value as
INT E1980S(1980);WLARDV. ERRMUE,MANAGINGBYCOMMNMCATION(1960);RoBERT
NEWCOMB & MARG SAmMONS, EMPLOYEE COMMUNICATIONS INACTION 106-26 (1961).
127. Id.; see Moore v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488,490 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that
employer used filmstrips to explain and to promote various benefits available under different
plans).
128. In one case, a district court observed:
Once an employee has rendered his years of service to the employer, his "sweat
equity," and has taken retirement, the employee furnishes little to the employer that
generates revenue, hence, the employer may perceive little risk in reducing the level
of benefits previously promised. Since an active employee generates revenues
beyond his wage and costs of overhead, he possesses the economic leverage to
bargain for benefits.... The employer who amends the company vacation policy
reducing annual vacation days from two weeks to two days will experience a mass
exodus of his labor pool. But, the employer who doubles the medical insurance
premiums for his retirees will receive the increased monthly checks from all those
who can afford it and cannot find an adequate substitute source of protection. The
retirees have no economic leverage, hence no bargaining position to check modifi-
cations of benefits made solely in the interest of their former employer. To permit
the enforcement of termination/modification clauses without a showing of good
cause has the effect of reducing the status of hard earned welfare plan benefits to
mere gratuities. Accurate financial forecasting or retirement planning is impossible
because continuation of the benefits is subject to the discretion of an employer.
Musto v.Am. Gen. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1483, 1496-97 (MI). Tenn. 1985), rev'd in part, 861
F.2d 897, 902 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that provision of group medical insurance did not imply
that retired employee had to give consent before employer could exercise reserved right to deter-
mine new premium contribution for retired employee).
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an employee ages. There are two reasons for backloading. First, the value of
a dollar of promised retirement income is directly related to the length of the
discount period- the interval between benefit accrual and retirement.1 9 Thus,
the older the employee, the shorter the discount period and the greater the
value of a dollar's worth of benefit. Second, many defined benefit plans are
based on a formula incorporating the employee's final pay - for example, 1%
of final pay times years of service. 30 An increase in compensation for one
year increases the value not only of that particular year's nominal benefit
accrual but also ofthe nominal benefit accrual of all prior years.
Under a traditional defined benefit plan, then, the bulk of a long-term
employee's benefits are "earned" in the last years of the employee's service.
Indeed, an employee who spends most of his working life with a single firm
will earn more than half of a final-pay defined benefit during the last ten years
of his employment.' 3' The implicit bargain reflected in a traditional defined
benefit plan is that the firm valued loyalty and long service and will reward
both hi the last years of employment with substantial defined benefit accruals.
129. See Norman P. Stein, Simpliftcation and I.R.C. § 415,2 FLA. TAXREV. 69,76 (1994)
(discussing time-value of money in context of contribution to defined benefit plans); Edward
A. ZeMinsky, ERMIA and the Emergence of the Defined Copribution Society, 57 N.Y.U. INST.
ONFED. TAXATION: EMPOYEBENEF AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION §§ 6.01,6.04(1), at
16-17 (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 1999) (providing examples of contributions need to fund defined
benefit plan in various stages of employee's career).
130. SeeDANM.MCGHLETAL.,FUNDAMENTAISOFPRIVATEPENSIONS204(7thed. 1996)
(explaining final average formula as type of benefit formula whereby final average formula
benefits are accrued on basis of participant's average compensation during specific period).
131. The following graph indicates the present value of each year's annual benefit accrual
in a plan that provides a benefit equal to 2% of final pay, assuming an assumed rate of return
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The firm, however, has the legal right to terminate a defined benefit plan
or to modify its benefit formula prospectively. 32 The financial gain to the
employer who does so can be substantial. While an employee's accrued bene-
fit at the time of a termination or modification is protected, the employee is
deprived of the implicit bargain the employer offered, that is, the substantial
benefits the employee would have earned during the last period of employ-
ment.133 The loss to a middle-age employee can be substantial.
C. Other Defined Benefit Plan Issues
There are two other significant linkage problems in defined benefit plans.
One involves the subsidized early retirement benefit included in some plans for
people who retire after a certain age or after a specified number of years of
service.' An employer can amend the plan, however, to eliminate or reduce
such subsidies for most employees.'35 For example, a plan might provide that
an employee with thirty years of service can retire at age fifty-five.'36 An
employee who is age fifty-five with twenty-five years of service begins plan-
ning to retire at age sixty, but in the interim, the employer amends the plan to
eliminate the benefit. While the employee still can retire at age sixty with the
benefit calculated based on his service and salary as of age fifty-five, the firm
has reduced the employee's age-sixty retirement benefit.
The second significant defined benefit plan linkage issue concerns under-
funded plans. A defined benefit plan's ability to meet benefit commitments
depends on the level of employer funding, the success with which the plan has
invested its assets, and the demographic characteristics of its participants. A
defined benefit plan can fail as a result of employer undercontribution, un-
successful investments, or unfavorable demographic experience. In cases of
plan failure, the federally chartered and regulated Pension Benefit Guaranty
132. See I.R.C. § 401(aX2) (1994) (permitting employer to recover surplus assets after
terminating plan); ERISA § 404(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(d) (1994) (discussing fiduciary obliga-
tions when employer decides to terminate plan); IYRC. § 41 l(dX6) (1994) (prohibiting retro-
active benefit decreases).
133. SeeRICHARDA. IPPOIxrO,PENSIONSECONOMICSANDPUBUCPOLICY233-52 (1986)
(discussing economic implications of loss to employee and breakage of implicit bargain between
employer and employee).
134. See MCGILLET AL, supra note 130, at 218 (noting that general practice of using early
retirement factors more favorable than actuarially equivalent ones is referred to as "subsidized
early retirement").
135. The only limitation in the Internal Revenue Code is LR.C. § 411 (dX6), which gener-
ally does not permit a retroactive reduction in such a benefit. I.R.C. § 411(dX6) (1994). An
employer may, however, amend a plan to reduce or eliminate the benefit for years of service
after the amendment
136. See, e.g., R.S. Rev. Rul. 85-6,1985-1 C.B. 133 (noting qualified defined benefitplan).
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Corporation (PBGC) takes over the plan and pays participants guaranteed
benefits."31 That can be far less thanthe employee's vested accrued benefits.'
D. Standard ofJudicial Review ofBenefit Denials
The Supreme Court in 1989 resolved a circuit split over whether a court
reviewing a benefit denial should accord deference to the plan administrator's
factual findings and plan interpretations. 39 The Court held that judges should
defer to a plan administrator ifthe plan's language vested the plan administra-
tor with discretionary authority to decide benefit claims.140 This approach to
judicial review of benefit denials creates linkage issues because a participant
is not entitled to the court's interpretation of a plan's provisions or resolution
of factual issues; the participant only is entitled to the court's determination
of whether the plan administrator's interpretation of the plan or findings of
fact is unreasonable.
This has been particularly problematic when there are disputed factual
issues, such as whether a participant is totally disabled. In those cases, courts
in many circuits focus not on the extent of disability of the participant, but on
whether the plan administrator behaved arbitrarily in determining that the
participant was not totally disabled.14' In numerous cases, courts have ruled
137. ERISA § 4022,29 U.S.C. § 1322(1994).
138. For example, the PBGC does not guarantee subsidized early retirement benefits, bene-
fits that resulted from plan amendments within sixty months of plan termination, or monthly
annuity benefits over a specified level, which for plans terminating in 2001 is $3,392.05. See
Richard D. Hylton, Don't Panic About Your Pension - Yet, FORTUNE, Apr. 18, 1994, at 121,
127-28 (illustrating case in which person's early retirement benefit declined in value by more
than 50% as result of PBGC takeover of plan).
139. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105 (1989). See generally
Daniel Fischel & John II Langbein, ERISA 's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive
BenefitRule, 55 U. CHL L. REV. 1105,1128-38 (1988); John HK Langbein, The Supreme Court
Flunks Trusts, 1990 S. CT. REv. 207 (1991); Norman P. Stein, ERISA and the Limits ofEquit,
56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 71, 94-100 (1993).
140. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. The precise holding of the Court in Firestone is that a
plan is a contract and that a reviewing court should review the plan de novo unless the "plan
gives discretion to an administrator," in which case courts should use a narrower standard of
review, such as an arbitrary and capricious standard. However, if the plan administrator or
fiduciary vested with discretionary interpretive power "is operating under a conflict of interest,
that conflict must be weighed as a 'factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discre-
tion."' Id. at 155 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 187, cmt d (1959)).
141. See, e.g., Clapp v. Citibank, NA. Disability Plan, 262 F3d 820, 828-29 (8th Cir.
2001) (noting that defendant's conclusion that plaintiffwas not permanently disabled under plan
was not unreasonable under facts); Delta Family-Care Disability & Survivorship Plan v.
Marshall, 258 F.3d 834,843 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding that when record reflected conflicting
medical opinions, plan administrator did not abuse its discretion in finding employee was not
disabled); Fletcher-Merritt v. NorAm Energy Corp., 250 F.3d 1174, 1180 (8th Cir. 2001)
(concluding that because plan administrator offered reasonable explanation for its decisions,
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that a plan administrator did not behave arbitrarily in denying disability bene-
fits to a participant whom the Social Security Administration has found to be
totally disabled. 42
E. Obscure Plan Provisions
Employee benefit plans sometimes include provisions that are not under-
stood by plan participants and have the effect of reducing the benefits to
which employees believed the plan entitled them. We offer two examples
from the files of a pension clinic at the University of Alabama School of Law.
In the first case, a plan provided a retirement benefit that included an
offset for worker's compensation benefits. 43 The summary plan description
mentioned, but did not describe, the offset in one sentence in its forty pages.
The union that had negotiated a series of collective bargaining agreements
with the employer was unaware of the provision, as were the management
personnel at the division in which the plan participant worked. The partici-
pant experienced a work-related injury and filed for worker's compensation
court should not disturb decisions even if another reasonable, but different, interpretation may
be made); Goad v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., No. 99-6615, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
8834, at *11 (6th Cir. May 2, 2001) (upholding defendant's plan determinations as rational in
light ofplan's provisions); Cochran v. Trans-General Life Ins. Co., Nos. 99-2102/99-2447,2001
U.S. App. LEXIS 7829, at *10 (6th Cir. Apr. 13, 2001) (concluding that decision of plan
administrator to deny plaintiff continued benefits was reasonable); Dwyer v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
No. 00-1514, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1541, at *24 (4th Cir. Feb. 5,2001) (finding defendant's
decision to deny plaintiff's claim reasonable result of defendant's claim review process);
Wojciechowski v. Metro Life Ins. Co., No. 00-7359,2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 828, at *8 (2d Cir.
Jan. 12, 2001) (noting that denial of benefits not clear error of judgment); Pari-Fasano v. ITT
Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 230 F3d 415,420-21 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that receipt of
Social Security disability benefits was not determinative of eligibility for long-term disability
benefits and insurer was not unreasonable in terminating benefits without conducting vocational
assessment). Butsee Myers v. Hercules, Inc., 253 F.3d 761,768 (4th Cir. 2001) (concluding that
defendant reached its decision to terminate plaintiff's benefits by unreasoned process and that
evidence did not support this decision); Ingram v. Martin Marietta Long Term Disability Income
Plan, 244 F.3d 1109, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that because plan did not confer discre-
tion on administrator to grant or deny benefits, court would review denial de novo); Postma v.
Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 223 F.3d 533, 538 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that plain language of
plan did not grant discretion to administrator and appropriate standard of review was de novo).
142. See, e.g., Elliot v. Sara Lee Corp., 190 F.3d 601, 604 (4th Cir. 1999) (concluding that
because Social Security determinations are not binding on administrator and disability standards
are not analogous, administrator was under no obligation to weigh agency's disability determi-
nation more favorably than other evidence); Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 846 F. Supp. 19
(2d Cir. 1995) (concluding that Social Security determinations are not binding on ERISA
plans); Anderson v. Operative Plasterers' & Cement Masons' Int'l Ass'n Local No. 12, 991
F.2d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that pension plan gave trustees discretion to deny
disability benefits even if Social Security Administrator had found disability).
143. The plan, summary plan description, and complaint are on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review.
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benefits. He ultimately settled his worker's compensation claim for a lump
sum payment of $50,000, 20% of which went to his lawyer. The offset for-
mula in the plan reduced his monthly pension to zero. The participant was
unaware that his settlement would have any effect on his pension.
In the second case, a large national employer sponsored a defined benefit
plan." The plan's benefit formula used a multiple of years of service and the
average compensation during the highest consecutive five years of pay during
the most recent ten years of employment. A participant in the plan took part-
time status, reducing her pay by approximately 50%. At the time she took
part-time status her accrued retirement benefit, a monthly annuity that began
at age sixty-five, was approximately $800 per month. Inher sixth year ofpart-
time status, her accrued benefit began to drop in value as the ten-year refer-
ence period began dropping off her full-time compensation years. Her benefit
ultimately declined in value to approximately $500 per month despite her
additional years of service for the firm. Her benefit would have thus been
greater had she quit rather than continued to work part-time. She was un-
aware that her decision to work part-time could reduce her already-accrued
pension benefits, although she might have been able to determine this before
she took part-time status if she had had a pension consultant review the plan
document. Such cases, although perhaps not common because they involve
a plan provision and an employee adversely affected by it, can result in devas-
tating effects on affected individuals. 4 '
F Theft and Mismanagement ofPlan Assets
Although ERISA imposes myriad rules governing the conduct of individ-
ual and corporate actors who control or manage employee benefitplan assets,'46
there have been numerous cases involvingthe abuse ofplan assets. Some cases
involve bad judgment or excessive risk-taking by investment managers.'47
144. The employer was Northwestern Airlines. A copy of its pension plan is on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review.
145. The employer ultimately converted the plan to a cash balance plan. As part of the
conversion, the employer amended the plan to use the highest consecutive five years of compen-
sation rather than the highest five years within the final ten years of employment, so the partic-
ipant ultimately was able to collect her unreduced benefit But prior to the conversion to a cash
balance format, the employer had rejected the participant's legal claim that the pension-reducing
provision was unlawful.
146. See ERISA, § 404(aX1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(aX1) (1994) (imposing prudential and
* loyalty duties on plan fiduciaries); ERISA § 408,29 U.S.C. § 1108 (1994) (creating prohibited
transaction rules).
147. Lanka v. O'Higgins, 810 F. Supp. 379 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that although 98%
of plan assets were invested in stock of three large yet troubled companies, there was no breach
ofERLSA fiduciay duty ofprudence)
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Others involve churning by investment managers. 148 Others involve firms,
often capital-strapped, dipping into plan assets or delaying payment of em-
ployee elective deferrals to 401(k) planS. 149 Some involve plan managers
selling fraudulently valued company stock to the plan or the plan selling it to
plan managers.
150
The consequences to participants of a decline in plan assets attributable
to mismanagement or theft vary depending on the circumstances. If plan
fiduciaries or plan participants learn of a resulting decline in plan assets, they
can bring a civil action to recoup plan loss.' They also may bring the loss
to the attention of the Department of Labor, which can investigate1 2 and, if
necessary, initiate civil proceedings against the wrongdoersS53 or refer the
matter for criminal prosecution.154 In some cases, however, the firm and its
principals may lack the ability to make the plan whole, or procedural or prac-
tical obstacles may prevent correction.'55
In defined contribution plans, an uncorrected plan loss will result directly
in a loss of retirement benefits. In defined benefit plans, the immediate impact
of a plan loss will generally be on the employer, who will face increased
future contribution obligations or a reduced potential reversion on plan termi-
nation. The loss, however, will in some cases result in reduced benefits to
participants. Ifthe PBGC takes over a plan that has become insolvent, partici-
148. See, e.g., Olson v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 957 F.2d 622, 628 (8th Cir. 1992) (involving
allegations of churning); Radiology Ctr., S.C. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 919 F.2d 1216, 1218
(7th Cir. 1990) (same).
149. The Department of Labor has filed numerous suits in the last several years against
employers that delayed deposit of employee elective deferrals into 401(k) plans. See, e.g.,
Labor Files Lawsuit for Misuse of Plan Assets, 28 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1662 (June 19,
2001); Court Judgment InvolvesAlleged Unsecured Loans, 23 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1564
(June 5, 2001); see also Explanation the Dep't ofLabor's Enforcement of EPJSA, Focusing on
Pension Security: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Labor of the Common Labor and Human
Resources, 101st Cong., 109 (1990) (statement of Karen Ferguson, Director of Pension Rights
Center, Washington, D.C.) (commenting that there is "case after case of.. . trustees who have
used pension plans as their personal piggy banks. The abuses [include] situations where small
business owners have dipped into plans to meet a cash flow crunch, help out a relative, or take
advantage of a too-good-to-be-true investment opportunity.").
150. Howard v. Shay, 100 F.3d 1484, 1490 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding breach of fiduciary
duty when fraudulently-valued company stock sold from plan to plan managers); Eyler v.
Comm'r, 88 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that plan managers sold company stock back to
plan at more than stock's worth).
151. ERISA § 502(aX2)-(3),29 U.S.C. § 1132(aX2X3) (1994).
152. ERISA § 504,29 U.S.C. § 1134 (1994).
153. ERISA § 502(aX2), (5), (6), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aX2), (5), (6) (1994).
154. ERISA § 501,29 U.S.C. § 1131 (1994).
155. For example, statute-of-limitations issues can arise in cases involving plan invest-
ments. See, e.g., Radiology Ctr., S.C. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 919 F.2d 1216,1218 (7th Cir.
1990).
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pant benefits will be reduced by the amount they exceed PBGC guarantees.""
Participants may also suffer indirect reductions to future benefits if the plan
sponsor reacts to a loss in plan assets by either terminating the plan or amend-
ing the plan to reduce the rate of future benefit accruals.
G. Some Thoughts About Linkage and Defined Contribution Plans
In the past two decades, defined contribution plans have replaced defined
benefit plans as the most common form of retirement vehicle. 57 Defined
contribution plans generally do not create linkage problems; the employee
receives exactly what is in his or her account, and there is no difference
between what the employee expects to receive from the plan and what the
employee in fact receives from the plan. However, the deeper structural issue
in linkage is not the disparity between what employees believe they have been
promised and what they actually have been promised, but rather it is the gap
between what the employee perceives to be the value of his or her benefits and
the actual value ofthose benefits. From this perspective, defined contribution
plans pose an issue similar to leakage because of a tendency for employees to
overvalue the benefits they will receive from defined contribution plans."5 8
There are two ways in which employees apparently overvalue defined
contribution accounts. First, many employees overestimate the rate of return
they are likely to achieve on their accounts. 59 Second, employees tend to
overestimate the amount of retirement income their account will provide once
they retire."6 Educational efforts, of course, may counter these effects to a
certain extent.
IV The Problem ofLeakage
The goal of retirement plans is to provide a continuing source of income
for people after they leave the labor market. In an ideal world, free of infla-
tion, a plan would provide its participants a periodic and constant annuity until
156. ERISA § 4022,29 U.S.C. § 1322 (1994).
157. In 1977 there were 121,655 defined benefit plans and 280,972 defined contribution
plans. The defined benefit plans covered almost thirty-five million employees while the defined
contribution plans covered slightly more than fifteen million. In 1996, there were 63,657
defined benefit plans and 632,566 defined contribution plans. The defined benefit plans cov-
ered approximately forty-one million employees while the defined contribution plans covered
over fifty million. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BU=ETIN, ABSTRACT OF
1996, FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS, at tbls. El & E5 (Wimter 1999-2000). See generally
Zelinsky, supra note 129 (noting rise of popularity of defined contribution plans).
158. See Testimony of Dallas Salisbury, President of Employee Benefits Research Institute,
U.S. Department of Labor, Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans,
Working Group on Preparing for Retirement 65, 68-75 (Apr. 9,2001).
159. Id. at 71-72.
160. Id. at 73.
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death. In the case ofmarried participants, a plan would provide a periodic and
constant annuity until the later of the death of the participant or his spouse,
perhaps with an appropriate downward adjustment after the first death to re-
flect the reduced expenses of a one-pension household."r Each year, how-
ever, retirement plans pay billions of dollars of benefits that are not so ap-
plied. Participants either spend these funds before retirement or exhaustthese
funds too quickly in retirement.
The most cited form of leakage is the lump sum payment of pension
benefits when a participant leaves employment or takes an in-service distribu-
tion from a 401(k) or other profit-sharing plan."6 Plans may choose to pay
participants cash when they leave ifthe benefit has a present value of less than
$5,000 orifthe employee consents. 63 Statistics derived fromthe 1993 Current
Population Survey indicate that 20% ofthe population who received lump sums
rolled over the entire amount into an IRA or other qualified plan, 40% rolled
over part of their distribution, and 40% did not roll over any part of their dis-
tribution.'" In sum, participants rolled over approximately two-thirds of the
total value ofthe distributions. Hewitt Company, in a survey of its 1996 data-
base, indicated that 40% of participants rolled over their distributions, repre-
senting 79% of the total distributed assets. 65 One should also note that not all
of the money rolled over into individual retirement accounts will stay there
because amounts in such accounts are easily accessible to the IRA owner."
The two studies noted above suggest that older participants and partici-
pants with large distributions (two groups with considerable overlap) are the
161. Even in a world without inflation, one could make this argument because the cost of
living will probably increase in the last years of life, when the individual is likely to have greater
health costs and may need long-term care. Moreover, even an individual who does not require
intensive care may need help with some routine tasks (such as cooking and transportation) that
they were able to perform for themselves earlier in retirement See, e.g., DRIVING MISS DAISY
(Warner Bros. 1989) (demonstrating elderly woman's need for assistance with routine tasks
when Dan Ackroyd hires Morgan Freeman to drive Jessica Tandy).
162. See CASHING OUT OURFUTURE?, supra note 12 (discussing various reports that leak-
age problems are often caused by lump sum payments and in-service distributions).
163. .R.C. §41l(aX11XA)(Supp.V 1999).
164. CASHING Our OUR FunnRs?, supra note 12. Professor Daniel Halperin and Alicia
Munnell, however, report that only 40% of employees rolled over lump sum distributions in
1996, which, it should be said, reflected an increase from 35% in 1993. Their figures are based
on an Employee Benefits Research Institute survey of large-plan lump sum payouts. DANIEL
LHALPEN&AUciAMNNE HoWTHEPENIoNSYsTmSHouLDBEREFoRMED 11 (Brook-
ings Inst. Conference, Sept 17, 1999), available at http'/www.brook.edu/es/erisa/99papers/
erisal0.pdf.
165. CASHNGOUTOuRFUruRE?,supra note 12.
166. There are no restrictions on when an individual can make withdrawals from an
individual retirement account. However, the government imposes a 10% excise tax on some
withdrawals from individual retirement accounts prior to the year in which the IRA owner
attains age 59.5. LR.C. § 72(t) (1994).
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most likely participant groups to roll over their distributions." This should
not, however, be a source of comfort. For purposes of thinking about leakage
from a retirement system, it makes more sense to project the future dollar
value of a distribution to the retirement age of the distributee. The following
chart shows the amount of lost benefits at age sixty-five for a $5,000 distribu-
tion using 6%, 8%, and 10% interest assumptions for a twenty-year old, a
thirty-year old, a forty-year old, a fifty-year old, and a sixty-year old.
Age 6% 8% 10%
20 68,823 159,602 364,452
30 38,430 83,927 140,512
40 21,460 34,242 54,174
50 11,983 15,861 20,886
60 6,691 7,347 8,052
Using the mid-range assumption, the thirty-year old's fhilure to preserve a
$5,000 distribution causes a loss of almost $75,000 of retirement benefits.
Congress has attempted to control leakage, in part, through the assess-
ment of a 10% excise tax on premature plan distributions that are not rolled
over." A distribution is generally premature if it is made to a participant
prior to the year in which the participant attains age 59.5.169 Over the last
fifteen years, however, Congress has carved out exceptions to the penalty tax
for plan and IRA withdrawals to pay for college tuition,'7o to pay health care
expenses, m or to help pay the down payment on a first home.172
Similarly, Congress limits in-service withdrawals from 401(k) plans to
cases ofhardship. 73 Congress permits hardship withdrawals in circumstances
similar to those that result in a waiver of the 10% excise tax, for example, to
pay medical expenses, to pay tuition, to purchase a first home, and other hard-
ships, such as the purchase of a car in some situations.'74
167. See CAsiNGOUT OURFUTUR?,supra note 12 (noting 89% rolloverrate for individ-
uals over age sixty and 95% rollover rate for distributions exceeding $100,000).
168. LR.C. § 72(t) (1994).
169. Id.
170. Id. § 72(tX2XE) (Supp. V 1999).
171. Id. § 72(tX2)(B) (Supp. V 1999).
172. Id. § 72(tX2)(F) (Supp. V 1999).
173. Id. § 401(kX2)(BXiXiv) (1994).
174. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-l(dX2) (2001).
1404
PROBLEMS WITH THE PRIVATE PENSION SYSTM4
One can argue that pre-retirement leakage from safe retirement plans is
not invariably a bad thing. Purchasing a home can be an important investment
for retirement, as can reducing high interest debt. If the home purchase or
debt reduction would not otherwise have taken place, perhaps permitting
access to retirement funds for such purposes is defensible policy. Moreover,
one can defend allowing access to retirement savings to pay for a child's
education on general policy grounds. To the extent it will enhance the child's
lifetime earnings and thus put the child in a better financial position, the
child's education might be considered an asset that enhances the parent's old
age security.
Some commentators argue that employees would be less likely to make
elective deferrals to 401(k) plans if they could not access their accounts in
times of financial stress. 175 Thus, in a voluntary retirement system in which
employee willingness to participate is necessary to the system's viability, it
is essential to fashion a policy compromise between locking up benefits until
retirement and encouraging voluntary participation by giving employees pre-
retirement access to their benefits in certain circumstances.
Discussion of leakage generally focuses only on participant access to
retirement plan assets prior to reaching retirement age. However, if the pur-
pose of qualified retirement plans is to ensure adequate income in retirement,
premature exhaustion of benefits (before death) or failure to exhaust assets in
retirement (by death) are also forms of leakage. The former is a source of
leakage if we conceptualize the idea of retirement security as a method of
providing a sufficient and generally steady stream of income after an individ-
ual permanently leaves the labor force because of age or disability. Front-
loading consumption by drawing down financial resources early in retirement
is inconsistent with this goal, and thus, one may characterize it as a form of
leakage. Moreover, in an economy in which some level of inflation is a
permanent feature and in a world in which expenses, particularly medical
expenses, increase with age, some degree of backloading of retirement bene-
fits may be necessary to maintain a stable standard of living. In addition,
dying without exhausting retirement resources and leaving the excess assets to
nondependent heirs is arguably a form of leakage from a system designed to
provide retirement income.
One may take issue with these broader conceptions of the idea of retire-
ment leakage. In particular, such a description of leakage suggests the appro-
priateness of placing limits on personal autonomy and choice. If such limits
are justifiable, it is because our private-sector retirement system is tax-subsi-
dized and has as its public purpose the provision of retirement income.
175. See CASHNG OUT OUR FUTURE?, supra note 12 (noting 68% participation rate in
plans that do not permit hardship withdrawals and 78% participation rate in plans that do permit
such withdrawals).
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Accepting such limits, however, suggests that the only way to eliminate post-
retirement leakage is through mandatory, inflation-indexed annuitization of
retirement benefits for the lifetime of an individual and, in most cases, the
individual's spouse or domestic partner.
Recent pension legislation and trends suggest that some of the problems
of post-retirement leakage are worsening and will continue to worsen. In the
last two decades, there has been a shift from defined benefit plans, in which
annuitization is common, to a defined contribution world in which it is not."6
Moreover, the creation of cash-balance and similar types of defined benefit
plans, which state benefits in the fbrm of a notional account balance rather
than a life annuity, has increased the likelihood of a cash-out on separation of
service and has decreased the likelihood of annuization on retirement.
177
TheEconomicGrowthandTaxReliefRecomciliationActof2001 (EGTRA)
includes provisiosthatwillexacerbateleakageproblems. First, EGTRAgreat-
ly increases the attractiveness of profit-sharing plans over money-purchase
plans, making it likely that many firms will abandon the latter plan form. 7
Money purchase plans, however, include an important anti-leakage feature: a
marriedparticipantgenerallymustobtainspousalconsentbeforetakingabenefit
distibutioninanyformexceptaqualifiedjoint-and-survivorannuity n9 Spousal
consent to a lump sum payment is nohmandatory in a profit-sharing plan.
EGTRA also increases the attractiveness of section 401(k) plans over
other forms of qualified plan forms. 80 We suspect, although we are not aware
of any empirical research verifying this suspicion, that participants have a
greater sense of immediate ownership of accounts to which they voluntarily
contribute than they do of benefits provided by an employer-sponsored plan.
A stronger sense of ownership will often carry with it a stronger aversion to
government control over access to retirement savings for non-retirement
usage. That most section 401(k) plans include provisions permitting hardship
withdrawals provides some indirect evidence for this view.
176. See generally WIznAMG. GA EETAL.,UNDERSTANDINGTHB SHIlT FROMDEFINED
BENmFfTODm CONTRIBUTIONPLANS (Brookings Inst Conference, Sept. 17,1999),avail-
able at http.//www.brook.edu/es/efisa/99papers/erisa2.pd see also Zeinsky, supra note 129
(noting rise in popularity of defined contribution plans).
177. See generally WhatAre Cash Balance Plans, CownINmGNCmIs, Sep/Oct 1999, at 18
(discussing mechanics of cash balance plans).
178. Prior to EGTRA, an employer could deduct contributions to a profit-sharing plan up
to 15% of compensation, a limit that did not apply to money-purchase pension plans. ILR.C.
§ 404(aX3) (1994). EGTRAincreased this limit to 25%. EGTRA § 616(aX1XA) (2001).
179. LR.C. § 401(aXl)(B) (1994).
180. For example, EGTRA § 611(dXl) increases the limits of elective deferrals from
$10,500 to $15,000; EGTRA § 613 exempts safe-harbor401(k) plans from the top-heavy rules;
EGTRA § 631(a) introduces special catch-up contributions made on an elective deferral basis
for participants over age fifty, EGTRA § 632 exempts elective contributions from the em-
ployer's deduction limits; and EGTRA § 617(a) creates Roth 401(k) plans.
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There is also some encouraging news about leakage. First, pre-retirement
leakage may diminish as educational efforts stress the value of saving for
retirement in tax deferred vehicles."' Second, EGTRA does include some
provisions that make it mildly easier to roll over assets between different forms
of tax-qualified plans, although the rules have long permitted roll overs to
individual retirement accounts and annuity contracts. 2
Overall, however, the problems of leakage are difficult ones for our pri-
vate pension system. It is difficult to envision a strong and politically viable
natural constituency supporting legislative adoption of meaningful controls on
leakage from the private pension system.
V Social Security Privatization
The problems of leverage, leakage, and linkage in private sector retire-
ment plans have implications for the debate over suggestions to privatize
Social Security. All three issues represent gaps in the private pension system
for which the Social Security system, as currently structured, constitutes the
public response. Privatization of Social Security would greatly weaken or, in
some cases, eliminate the compensating features of the current system - man-
datory and universal coverage, life annuity payments with no lump sum or
early withdrawal possibility, and guaranteed wage and price indexed benefits
backed by the federal taxing power. Fully or partially replacing the current
defined benefit structure with a system of personal IRA-style accounts would
simply import the gaps of the current private pension system into the Social
Security system, inevitably resulting in much less retirement security for most
workers.
A. Loss ofLeverage in the Private Pension System
As discussed above, the concept of leverage has been an essential part of
the voluntary private pension system for sixty years or more, primarily as a
way to ensure access to retirement for workers at low- and moderate-income
or wage levels. There is no concomitant need for leverage in Social Security
because the public system is both mandatory and virtually universal."a How-
ever, if the value and effectiveness of leverage is decreasing in the voluntary
system, does or can Social Security fill the gap, particularly for low- and mod-
erate-wage workers? Unfortunately, the system, even as currently structured,
does not provide sufficient benefits for low- and moderate-income workers to
181. Facts from EBRI, Rollover Rates (Mar. 2000), available athttp'/lwww.ebriorg/faCft/
0300factl .htm, indicate that job changers have increased asset rollovers from 35% in 1993 and
48% in 1998.
182. EOTRA § 641(a) (2001).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1994).
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make up for the lack of private pension income, and the situation is likely to be
worse under any privatized version of Social Security.
Social Security is currently the sole or primary source of retirement
income for half of all Americans over age sixty-five, as well as for many
young families relying on survivor benefits in the wake of the loss of the fam-
ily wage earner.8 4 The low level of benefits available under Social Security,
particularly for elderly retirees and even more particularly for elderly women,
generally relegates those relying primarily or solely on Social Security to
living at or below the poverty line in old age.' It is very unlikely that priva-
tizing Social Security would improve the situation of the aged poor, who, as
this Article suggests, are almost sure to receive even less as a group from pri-
vate sector retirement plans in the future than they have in the past. 86
Moreover, middle-class aged, those comprising the ranks of skilled work-
ing class and low- to mid-level white collar and service workers during their
184. Soc. SEc. ADMIN. OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION, AmD STATISTICs, INCOME OF
TEAGED CHARTBOOK, 1996, at 8-9 (1998) [hereinafter INCOME OF THE AGED CHARTBOOK].
Social Security is a source ofincome for nearly all the aged. More than 9 out of 10
aged units receive Social Security benefits. Asset income is the next most common
source of income, received by nearly two-thirds of the aged. Less than half (41%)
receive pensions other than Social Security, and only 21% have earnings. Public
assistance is received by 6% and veterans' benefits by only 5%. *Includes private
pensions and annuities, government employee pensions, Railroad Retirement, and
IRA, Keogh, and 401(k) payments. Social Security provides at least half of total
income for a majority of beneficiaries. Social Security pays benefits to more than
90% of those aged sixty-five or older. It is the major source of income (providing
50% or more of total income) for 66% of the beneficiaries. It contributes 90% or
more of income for almost one-third of the beneficiaries, and is the only source of
income for 18% ofthem.
Id.
185. U.S. CENSUSBuREAU, PoVERTY iN THE UNiTED STATES, 1999, at2-5 thl.2 (2000).
186. John Mueller, Three New Papers on "Privatizing" Social Securily, One Conclusion:
Bad Idea, Address at the National Press Club (Oct 14, 1997), transcript available at http'/f
www.globalaging.orgpension/us/socilsec/mueller.htm. But see INCOME OFTBEAGMD CHART-
BOOK, which notes that
Social Security plays a pivotal role in reducing poverty. Although there are aged
beneficiaries with family income below the poverty line,* the poverty rate would be
much higher if they did not have Social Security benefits. Nine percent of aged
beneficiaries are poor, and 41% are kept out of poverty by their Social Security
benefits - so that the total poverty rate without Social Security would be 50%.
Although poverty rates vary considerably by marital status and race, the proportion
kept out of poverty by their Social Security benefits is about 40% for all groups.
*Based on family income of aged persons to conform with official measures of
poverty.
INCOME OF THE AGED CHARTBOoK, supra note 184, at 10.
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working lifetimes, are probably equally unlikely to see their retirement in-
comes improved or even maintained at current levels in any private account
retirement system. Many in this second cohort of retirees may have enough
private pension and savings resources that, when combined with Social Se-
curity, allow them to live comfortably above the poverty line in the context of
the current systemY.'r However, the features of the current system that most
strongly underwrite the maintenance during retirement of a middle-class pre-
retirement standard of living and the survival at the poverty level of poorer
workers in retirement are generally absent from a privatized retirement system
model. Furthermore, additional changes suggested to finance the transition
to a privatized system would only further decrease the adequacy of Social
Security benefits that even now are barely adequate to compensate for the
gaps in the private retirement system.
First, both low- and moderate-income workers and retirees benefit from
the redistributive features ofthe Social Security benefit structure.I ss Over the
years, there has been substantial criticism of this redistributive feature, both
from those who would like to see greater redistribution of income within a
broader social welfare system89 and from those who largely base their advo-
cacy of privatization on their opposition to income redistribution in prin-
ciple.' Nonetheless, the weighting in the benefit formula, which provides a
higher than proportional benefit for low-wage workers and a lower than pro-
portional benefit for high-wage workers, remains one of the few mechanisms
in American social welfare programs for direct income redistribution in a
largely politically successful context.
The private system, of course, can be said to mirror the income distribu-
tion of Social Security. higher-wage workers receive pension benefits that are
at least proportionate to their income levels. The benefit structure of most
private plans, combined with disproportionately higher coverage under plans
for high-wage workers, means that as a group they receive the lion's share of
187. Soc.SEc.ADMN.,INCoMEoFTHEPopuLATION55oRODER, 1996,at 1 tbLLI,123
tbl. VI.5 (1998).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 415 (1994); see LeeA- Sheppard, SftippingSocialSeurit, ofltsRedis-
tributive Features, 96 TAX NOTES 1012 (1996) (contrasting privatized system to current legisla-
tive system).
189. See, e.g., TmDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL PoIcYiN TBE UNITED STATES: FuTuRE Possi-
BmnIES IN HISTORiCAL PERSPECTIVE 265, 267-72 (1995) (advocating delivery of more income
through public means to all working families); Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Se-
curity: Misguided Refonn, 71 TEMP. L. REv. 131,167 (1998) (suggesting that current system
results in better redistribution of wealth because participants would incur increased costs under
privatized system).
190. See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman, Federal Tax Policy in the NewMillennium: Uni-
versal Pensions, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 95,126 (1999) (discussing negative effects of using payroll
tax system as vehicle for redistributing wealth).
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private pension benefits. 91 This pattern is inextricably linked to the principle
of leverage - without the possibility of, as it were, reverse income distribu-
tion, highly paid employees would have little incentive to participate in or to
pressure employers to establish qualified pension plans. However, without the
redistributive features of Social Security that provide at least some retirement
income protection for low-wage workers, the degree of coverage for such
workers that a privatized system might as a consequence require of private
pensions would be difficult to achieve under the current tax structure. 192
Second, the indexing ofwage records to increases in average wages during
the worker's lifetime assures the relationship of the Social Security benefit to
the worker's pre-retirement income level."9 Similarly, yearly automatic cost-
of-living benefit increases preserve the purchasing power of the benefit in
retirement necessary for maintenance of the standard of living established at
retirement.'" Neither feature exists in private defined benefit pension systems,
and there is no real equivalent to insure adequate old age income in the private
account systems suggested as replacements for Social Security.
The adequacy of any private account system, whether a private defined
contribution plan, such as the popular 401(k) features of profit-sharing plans,
or a privatized social security system, depends on the investment performance
of amounts held in the accounts, almost more so than on the initial amounts
deposited. Opponents of privatization have noted that, on average, the poor
are less likely to understand investment management and are more likely to
be victims of fraud or sharp sales practices. Their accounts will be smaller,
which may, depending on the form of privatization implemented, result in
higher fees and access to fewer investment alternatives.'95 Low- and moder-
ate-income earners will have less ability to monitor their employer's timely
transmittal of funds to their designated private investment accounts and less
ability to monitor their investment manager's record keeping and investment
performance. They will also have fewer resources to address the inevitable
problems that will arise in these areas.
191. In 1992, households in the top 20% of income levels received about 55% of all
pension wealth, while households in the bottom 40% of income received only 6% of pension
wealth. Also, in 1998, pension income constituted almost 30% ofthe income of the households
in the top 20% in income, while it constituted only 10% of the income of households in the
bottom 40% in income. Munnell & Sunden, supra note 33, at 53 tbl.7AL
192. See supra Part 11 (suggesting that current Internal Revenue Code structure provides
substantial tax subsidies of qualified pension plans).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)-(i) (1994).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 415(i) (1994).
195. See, e.g., Kathryn L. Moore, Partial Privatization of Social Security: Assesing Its
Effect on Women, Minorities, and Lower-Income Workers, 65 Mo. L. REV. 341,353-57 (2000)
(noting that women, minorities, and low-income workers tend to have less investment experi-
ence and would therefore be disadvantaged under privatized system).
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Moreover, any tax deferral inherent in privatized investment accounts
will work to the relative advantage of high-income workers whose Social Se-
curity accounts would receive a larger tax subsidy than workers who pay tax
at low marginal tax rates." Thus, there are reasons to suspect that the benefit
structure under a privatized account system will be regressive in practice, thus
importing into Social Security one of the main deficiencies of the private
system's reliance on leverage to increase coverage of low-wage workers.
It might be argued that. although this issue is genuine, preserving an
adequate minimum benefit can mitigate it. However, preserving an adequate
minimum benefit for the poor may face political obstacles because the larger
the minimum benefit is, the smaller the size of guaranteed benefits for other
beneficiaries is likely to be. Moreover, a minimum benefit approach to pre-
serving adequacy completely ignores the essential, broad-based middle class
focus of Social Security, which the government designed to prevent poverty
in old age by linking benefits to lifetime wage patterns rather than to alleviate
it for those who are so poor in old age as to qualify for any minimum benefit
that Congress might enact."9
It is perhaps more troubling that proponents of privatization have sug-
gested paying for privatization with Social Security benefit decreases. Two
of these decreases would greatly affect the elderly poor even if the current
minimum benefit remained intact and also would substantially decrease bene-
fits for middle-class retirees, resulting in a much larger group of poor elderly
than currently exists.
The first suggested decrease is an adjustment to the Social Security cost-
of-living formula for benefit adjustments in retirement, which, according to
some studies, overstates the effects ofinflation onthe elderly by between .5 and
1.5%. 19" The effect ofthis overstatement is a slight upward adjustment in the
real value of a Social Security benefit as the pensioner ages. Such an upward
adjustment in real value is desirable for the elderly poor because they start-their
retirement below the poverty level. Moreover, as people age, their level of
dependency, and consequently their cost of living, generally increases in real
196. See supra Part fI (suggesting that tax subsidies of pension plans benefit high-income
workers because they have greatest capacity to save funds for retirement).
197. See Dilley, supra note 3, at 1031-33 (noting that original intent of Depression-era
formers of Social Security system was to combine entitlements based on earnings with redistri-
bution of wealth).
198. See Soc. SEC. ADMN., THEBosKMIREPoRT: TOWARD AMOREACCURATE MEASURE
OF THE COST OF LIvING 9-11 (1996) (discussing hypothetical increase in federal revenue and
decrease in federal outlays that would result if formula adjusted); see also Christine Weller,
Shortchanging the Next Generation: Proposed Social Security Cut Would Index Benefits to
2006 Living Standards Level, Eroding Retirement Income for Everyone Thereafter, ECON.
POL'Y INST. ISSUE BRIEF No. 162 (2001) (suggesting that cost of living adjustments should not
only account for wage and price inflation, but also increases in living standards).
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terms."9 Finally, even those who are not "poor" when they initially retire (be-
cause they have other sources of income such as a private pension and savings)
generally come to depend more and more on Social Security as a source of
income precisely because Social Security benefits are indexed for inflation
while other sources are not.2" One should regard changing the indexation
formula as an undesirable benefit cut, not simply a "technical correction," that
could have dramatic effects in generally increasing poverty rates for the elderly.
The second suggested decrease would raise the Social Security normal
retirement age.20 1 Of course, calling this change "raising the retirement age"
is really a misnomer because mandatory retirement is no longer legal. The
only change Congress really can make is to reduce benefits for those who con-
tinue to retire at the current early or normal retirement ages, which Congress
accomplished in the 1983 Social Security Amendments. 2" Workers are free
to continue to retire at age sixty-two or at age sixty-five, but the benefits for
those retiring in 2000 and later will be lower than under prior law.2"o
Ironically, one of the arguments for Social Security privatization is that
the progressive benefit structure is illusory since the poor have, on average,
shorter life expectancies than middle- and upper-income individuals.2°4 Rais-
ing the Social Security retirement age, then, might have a disproportionate
impact on the overall benefits paid to the elderly poor. Of more concern,
however, is the reality that the elderly poor are likely to have had more phys-
ically-taxing jobs and lives than average, and early retirement for them may
often result from necessity rather than choice.20" For those poor, increasing
199. See, e.g., STAFF OFHOUsECOMM. ONWAYS AND MEANS, 103D CONG., 1993 GREEN
BOOK OVERVIEW OF ENTTEMENT PROGRAMS 1286 tbl.15 (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter
1993 GREEN BOOK] (comparing income sources of poor and non-poor elderly).
200. Id.
201. Social Security reform proposals introduced in the 105th Congress incorporate a
benefits-eligibility age increase. See S. 1792, 105th Cong. (1998) (proposing age seventy by
2073) (introduced by Moynihan and Kerrey); S. 2313, 105th Cong. (1998) (proposing age
seventy by 2029) (introduced by Gregg and Breaux); HL 4256,105th Cong. (1998) (proposing
age seventy by 2029) (introduced by Kolbe and Stenholm); H.R. 2768, 105th Cong. (1997)
(proposing age seventy by 2029) (introduced by Sanford); H.R. 2929, 105th Cong. (1997) (pro-
posing age seventy by 2028) (introduced byPorter); H.R. 3082,105th Cong. (1997) (proposing
age sixty-nine by 2018) (introduced by Smith). For examples of other plans, see COML FOR
ECON. DEV., FIXING SOCIAL SECURn2 (1997) (proposing age seventy by 2030); IREPORTOF
THE 1994-1996 ADvIsoRy COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURrIY 28 (1997) (proposing longevity
indexed to Individual Account Plan).
202. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 201, 97 Stat 107
(increasing retirement age).
203. Id.
204. See Kathryn L. Moore, The Privatization Process: Redistribution Under a Partialy
Privatized Social Security System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 969,988 n.81 (1998).
205. The opposition in the House of Representatives in 1983 to raising the retirement age
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the normal retirement age will result in a reduction of monthly income sup-
port. In addition, even for middle-class workers, the possibility of illness,
injury, or layoffi forcing retirement at or before age sixty-two is very real, so
that any decrease in benefits designed to induce workers to stay in the labor
force longer is just as likely to push middle-class workers into poverty as it is
to "raise the retirement age."
The final characteristic of Social Security that most directly contrasts the
private pension system's need for "leverage" is the extent of coverage - the
Social Security system is virtually universal and mandatory.2' One cannot
overstate the importance of universal mandatory coverage and complete
portability from job to job, particularly in contrast to the voluntary nature of
the private pension system. The leverage feature encourages pension forma-
tion by employers with stable, highly-paid work forces and has inevitably
produced only partial coverage, largely leaving out those groups most in need
of supplemental old age income - the working poor, the underemployed, and
those who work no longer than two or three years at any one job.2°f
It may well be possible to construct a mandatory and universal privatized
Social Security system if the current payroll tax withholding structure could
bear the administrative burden of collecting contributions. However, the
lower overall level of retirement income that would likely result from a
private account system would vitiate the effect of universal coverage.
B. Leakage
The purpose of a retirement system is to provide income after someone
leaves the labor market because of age or disability. Leakage occurs when
workers use assets of that system for other purposes. Discussion of leakage
generally arises inthe context ofpreretirement distributions, particularly when
an employee separates from service with an employer and receives a benefit
distribution. This Article, however, defines the problems of leakage more
broadly to extend to disproportionate consumption of retirement savings early
in retirement (both because of premature distribution of the savings to the
worker and because of costs and risks of loss associated with maintenance and
investment of investment accounts) and to a failure to consume fully such
focused on this concern. See 129 CoNG. REc. H1048-49 (1983) (reciting floor arguments by
Congressman Richardson on PickleAmendment to I-R. 1900 that would raise retirement age).
206. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 199, at 3 (estimating that 96% of workers are
covered by Social Security).
207. According to the GeneralAccounting Office, only about 21% of those who work part
time or part of a year were covered by any sort of pension plan in 1998, in contrast to the almost
50% ofall employees covered. U.S. GEN.ACCOUNTING OF CE, CHARAc'ERISTIcs OF PERSONS
IN TEE LABORFORCE WrOUT PENSION COVERA( (GAO/HEHS-00-131), REPORT TO CON-
GRESSIONALREQUESTORS 12 fig. 2 (2000).
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assets by death. In addition, the period of retirement should extend to the
second death for a married couple, in recognition of the reality of household
planning and saving for retirement.
n the private pension syster, it is likely that the problem of pre-retire-
ment leakage will at least continue and probably increase, although educa-
tional efforts focused on the importance of preserving savings for retirement
and the increased proclivity toward retirement savings of an aging workforce
might mitigate the problem somewhat. Nonetheless, the trend toward cash
balance defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans, and particularly
401 (k) plans, in which the concept of voluntary salary deferral fosters a sense
of immediate ownership and access, as well as recent legislative changes
encouraging some firms to abandon their money purchase pension plans, will
create additional leakage pressures on the system.2"
The increasing prevalence of cash balance and defined contribution plans
will also contribute to other leakage issues, particularly the failure to annui-
tize. Furthermore, indexation of benefits, such as post-retirement cost-of-
living increases, in defined benefit plans, which commonly took place on an
ad hoc basis through the mid-1980s, is now a rarity.
Social Security, in contrast, is a largely leak-proof system, with no oppor-
turinity for pre-retirement consumption of benefits (for which there is little
pressure because the program provides survivor and disability benefits inde-
pendently of the retirement benefit, as well as mandatory annuitized benefits
on retirement).' ° Moreover, Social Security provides mandatory spousal
benefits and indexes all benefits to the cost of living. 1' By design, Social
Security's benefit structure and method of payment result in the provision of
retirement income, not estate building opportunities, and thus the life annuity
form, with no remainder to go to heirs, normally guarantees consumption of
benefits during the retiree's lifetime.
In theory, it is possible to design a private account Social Security system
with minimal leakage issues. Such a system would not permit pre-retirement
access, would limit investments of accumulations to some type of indexed
eqity or bond funds with minimal management costs, and would require the
participant to purchase an inflation-protected annuity benefit with spousal
protections. While this is not the probable design for a privatized system,
even this model presents substantial problems. The two most critical sources
of leakage in such a system would be management of account investments at
high cost, risk, and resistance to any mandatory annuity payout.
208. See supra Part IV (suggesting that workers' misperceptions about real future value
of their benefits often contribute to leakage).
209. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402,413-415 (1994) (providing for eligibility, computation, and
payment of Social Security benefits).
210. Id.
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Many commentators have raised the issue of the administrative costs of
maintaining and investing private accounts as the hidden cost of'privatization,
and one should view the issue as a possible major source ofpre-retirement, as
well as post-retirement, leakage in any privatized version of Social Security.
The contrast between low likelihood of leakage in the current Social Security
program and the high probability of it in a privatized program should not be
a surprise for the following two reasons: the current program's earnings-
based entitlement structure and its lack of need for generation of profits for
the managers.
First, the costs of administering the Social Security system are quite
low - about one-half of one percent of the total outlay in benefits each year,
a figure which covers salaries of Social Security Administration employees
and maintenance of hundreds of district offices all over the country (comput-
ers, etc.).2 n Social Security is mostly an automatic program with few individ-
ual entitlement decisions to make (apart from the disability program). Be-
cause past earnings recorded through the payroll tax withholding system
throughout workers' careers determine benefits, there is little need for per-
sonal meetings between the agency and beneficiaries and little need or scope
for judgments on individual cases. Moreover, the only costs associated with
running the program are government salaries; nobody gets rich from running
a Social Security district office or managing the trust funds.
The administrative costs of a personal account system, on the other hand,
could be extremely high, both because of the individual decision-making
involved in investing millions of individual retirement accounts and because
of the profits such managers would extract as the price for their advice. This
cost could be as high as 10% to 25% of the amounts deposited,21 2 primarily in
fees paid to investment advisors and stock brokers and in various types of
investment and transaction fees. The experiences of government pension
programs in other countries that have privatized systems in whole or in part
demonstrate that the fees extracted by those hired to help individual workers
with their private accounts seriously diminishes individual investment
returns.213 The estimated effect of administrative costs and profit taking on
211. See BD. OF TRS., FED. OD-AGE& SUR vIVORS INS. &DISAHrINS. TRUST FuNDS,
2000 ANNUAL REPORT 6 tbl. I.C. 1 (2000) (comparing trust fund income to expenditures in
1999).
212. See LAWRENcE H. THOMPSON, ADm sTERNG INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTs IN SOcIAL
SECUrrY: THB ROI OF VALUES AND OBJEnVES IN SHAPING OFTONS 6 (Urban Inst, Ret
Project, Occasional Paper No. 1, 1999) (noting that under highly centralized federal model,
additional annual costs are less than 0.1% of assets under management). Costs are substantially
higher when the activities are highly decentralized. In the UK, charges averaged around 10%,
and, in Chile, the charge ran about 19% of contributions. Id; see also infra note 213 (estimating
administrative costs in Chile by 1999 at 25%).
213. A recent monograph published by the United Nations concluded that administrative
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private account returns was sufficient to induce the chairman ofthe last Social
Security Advisory Board to tell Congress that he could no longer support a
private account plan.214
One response to these concerns might be simply to insist that each
individual worker can and should manage her own retirement savings in an
individual account system.2" This perspective, we suggest is cynical in the
extreme. Most Americans do not have the resources, the expertise, or even
the 'time to make informed judgments on the constant, everyday level that
would be necessary to ensure that their individual accounts would increase in
value enough to support their retirement. Even during the heyday of the bull
markct, untrained investors, such as day traders who used computer trading
accounts as a new form of casino gambling, frequently lost family savings and
went into debt, essentially eliminating their own retirement incomes.216
Indeed, this kind of computer trading itself may have made the stock
market more volatile, and stock prices more artificial, rising and falling on
costs of the Chilean system by 1999 were close to 25%. Jorge Bravo & Andras Uthoff, Transit-
ional Fiscal Costs and Demographic Factors in Shifting From Unfunded to Funded Pension
in Latin America, U.N. Doe. LC/L 1264-P, U.N. sales No. E.99.ILG.38, at5 (1999). The study
also examined the transitional costs involved in shifting from unfunded to funded pension
systems in Latin America, essentially in the Chilean model, and concluded that "in several
countries, especially those with more aged populations and high coverage systems, the pension
debt is very high, and that a switch from unfunded to fully funded systems implies substantial
fiscal costs, that may even turn out to be economically and politically unviable .... " Id.
214. Retirement Security Policy, Proposals to Preserve and Protect Social Securi, Hear-
ing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. 50 (1998) (statement of Edward Gran-
lich) (proposing that "[u]nlike the other two plans proposed in the Advisory Council report,
there would be no reliance at all on the stock market to finance Social Security benefits, and no
worsening of the finances of the Health Insurance Trust Fund").
215. For example, in one article, Senator Don Nickles highlighted the advantages of
individual management of retirement accounts:
Today, Americans are increasingly aware of the need for long-term financial plan-
ning and are capable of handling their own investments. Indeed, surveys show that
Americans are already investing in the private market and becoming better educated
about how it works.... The statistics show that Americans are indeed smart
enough to invest for themselves. Moreover, they want to have ownership over their
own futures.
Senator Don Nickles, Policy Essay: Retiring in America: Why the United States Needs a New
Kind ofSocialSecurityfor the New Millennium, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGMS. 77,106-08 (1999).
216. Deborah McGregor, Levitt Warns lnquiry of Risk in Day Trading, FIN. TmA5 (Lon-
don), Sept. 17, 1999, at Americas 6 (reporting that "Arthur Levitt, [then] chairman of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), told a congressional panel that investors were
being swayed by misleading claims of riches to be won, when in fact day traders were far more
likely to lose their shirts"); see also Tom Walker, If You Love to Play the Marke4 Take This
Test- You May Have a Problem, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 13,1994, at F3 ("'Many aggres-
sive investors are really gamblers in disguise,' says Financial World in its Jan. 18 issue. The
magazine offers a 10-point questionnaire designed to reveal a person's gambling tendency.").
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rumors or that elusive measure "consumer confidence" without any corre-
sponding changes in company earnings or future prospects. 217 According to
Robert Shiller of Yale:
The high recent valuations in the stock market have come about for no
good reasons. The market level does not, as so many imagine, represent
the consensus judgment of experts who have carefully weighed the long-
term evidence. The market is high because of the combined effect of in-
different thinking by millions of people, very few of whom feel the need
to perform careful research onthe long-terminvestmentvalue ofthe aggre-
gate stock market, and who are motivated substantiallyby their own emo-
tions, random attentions, and perceptions of conventional wisdom. Their
all-too-human behavior is heavily influenced by news media that are
interested in attracting viewers or readers, with limited incentive to disci-
pline their readers with the type of quantitative analysis that might give
them a correct impression of the aggregate stock market level."'
Of course, Shiller wrote these words before the decline of the market be-
ginning in early 2000, which has resulted in a 15-20% drop in overall market
share prices. In a bear market, the shortcomings of a retirement system
relying solely on individual savings and investments are more glaringly ap-
parent.
The dangers of a completely equity-based retirement system have been
illustrated in stark fashion by the plight of employees of the Enron corpora-
tion, whose retirement plan consisted solely of a 401 (k) cash or deferred plan
invested largely in Enron stock which became worthless upon Enron's decla-
ration of bankruptcy. While some of these employee's accounts could have
been partially salvaged by more diverse investment holdings, their reliance on
the advice of their employer and of investment analysts generally who contin-
ued to advise buying Enron stock well into the year 2001 demonstrates the
high risk of private investing for most workers. In the wake of accounting and
investment advising scandals accompanying the Enron debacle, it'seems clear
that even well-advised and informed investors can easily be misled into bad
investments by those same advisors.219
217. David BarbozaN.A.S.D. ChiefCautionsFirmsabouttheInternetTradingRiksN.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at C9 (noting National Association of Securilies Dealers's (N.A.S.D.) in-
creased scrutiny of day traders, suggesting that day traders are creating volatile and risky markets).
218. ROBERT J. SHILER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 203(2000).
219. The Enron bankruptcy has, of course, prompted a flood of articles that will only in-
crease over the coming months. For reporting and commentary on the 401(k) problems of Enron
employees, see generally Robert Luke, 401 (k) Plans Embraced: Workers Still Want Company
StockDespite Enron Fall, ATL. 3. & CONsT., Feb. 1, 2002, at Cl; Richard Stevenson & Stephen
Labaton, Bush to Propose More Flexibility on 401(k) Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2002, at Al.
For an analysis of how the Enron bankruptcy should inform the Social Security privatization
debate, see Paul Krugman, EditorialA DefiningIssue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,2001, atA20.
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A second "leakage" problem in a newly privatized social security system
would be the possibility of access to the funds in an account either before
retirement or during retirement in a way that would endanger the life-time
income stream necessary to support the individual until death. Most, but not
all, privatization advocates eschew the concept of mandatory annuitization.' °
Moreover, there would be practical problems if the system used private insur-
ers to underwrite the annuity contracts, as some have proposed: annuitization
of small accounts would be costly, insurance companies are not likely to issue
indexed annuities, and participants would be at risk of insurer insolvency,
which opponents would use as an argument against privatization.'
If we were to implement a private account regime with safeguards against
leakage, political pressures still ultimately might push the system to a different
design. In the private system, employees may withdraw funds from 401(k)
plans in some circumstances, and there is no excise tax on pre-retirement
withdrawals from plans and individual retirement accounts when employees
make withdrawals for certain approved purposes. The pressures that produced
these leaks in the private pension system may well result in similar leaks from
a privatized social security system, in which people have accounts to which
they contribute and thus may have a sense that they should be able to access
that money, at least in emergencies.
Similar pressures would push for modification of any initial rule requir-
ing annuitiation. Moreover, societal and political sympathy might be particu-
larly high in cases when people have strong need for access to their accounts,
such as sickness or purchasing a home. Any carveout for special purposes
would also impose an administrative cost on the system to determine eligibil-
ity for an exception.
In addition, the design of a mandatory annuitization - whether structured
around the private insurance market, a governmental insurance provider, or
some combination - may lead to participant dissatisfaction and consequent
political pressure to drop required annuitization. If the private insurance
market is the exclusive structure for providing annuities, annuities will likely
vary dramatically depending on interest rates at the time of annuitization.
Pensioners disadvantaged by this and who see similarly situated individuals
220. For'example, Senator Nickles clearly sees advantages in worker ownership of a lump
sum result of investment performance, whose payout would not be connected to longevity and
which workers could pass along to heirs. Nickles, supra note 215, at 98-99.
221. Annuitization would likely also add even more costs to an individual account system.
For example, in discussing the charges for converting fund balances into annuities, Thompson
notes, "Individual choice comes at a cost, however. A recent analysis of annuity charges in the
United States suggests that a 65-year old male should expect to pay the equivalent of roughly
20 percent of the value in his account to convert the lump sum into an annuity." THOMPSON,
supra note 212, at 6.
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receiving larger annuities are likely to feel cheated by the system. Insurance
companies issuing annuities have much higher administrative costs than the
Social Security system, and those costs will be a drag on benefits. Even if a
captive market results in a lowering of annuity load factors among private
insurers, the necessity of having two systems will impose additional costs,
which will lower benefits. It is also possible that insurers will not want to
annuitize small account balances, leading to political pressure to limit armuiti-
zation options for such individuals. If the government moved in as insurer of
last resort for those with small account balances, the annuitization factors may
be different, and less favorable, for those with small accounts.
A purely governmental annuitization program might also engender politi-
cal pressures to opt out ofthe system. Ifthe government had to annuitize with
a single conversion rate, individuals with large account balances, long life
expectancies, and consumer savvy might argue that the rules should permit
them to use a private insurer if they can secure more favorable annuitization
rates. Such pressure might lead to insurers underwriting the best risks and
increasing costs for the governmental program. Participants left inthe govern-
mental program, faced with higher annuitization rates, might argue that the
rules should permit them to opt out of annuitization. One might expect
similar results if the initial design of the system contained governmental and
private components. Thus, there is a substantial risk that even if the initial
system design required annuitization, the concept of mandatory annuitization
might erode over time.
Governmental participation in an annuitization program would also create
possible public finance issues. If interest rates fall, the government - unless
it purchased secure long-term debt instruments, which might include purchas-
ing such instruments from itself- would assume an insurance risk that it may
ultimately have to finance out of public revenues. If interest rates rise and the
system shows a surplus, there might be pressure from participants to provide
upward adjustments to benefits and pressure from other political actors to
allow government to dip into the "surplus" for other programs.
Thus, developing a program of private accounts within the Social Secu-
rity system carries with it the possibility of introducing leakage into the Social
Security retirement program. Indeed, one of the strongest attractions of
privatization appears to be the accumulation and inheritance of wealth possi-
ble in a personal account system, in contrast to the income maintenance with-
out estate building that is an essential feature of social insurance systems gen-
erally. The risk of either losing the amounts in such accounts or expending
the savings on non-retirement income purposes may to many Americans be
worth the possibility of disproportionate gain through investment of an indi-
vidual account. The problem is that the risk is much higher for those who
have the fewest additional resources to support them in old age.
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C. Linkage or Failures of Expectation
The final gap in the private pension system that the current structure of
Social Security most effectively fills is the problem of expectation of income
security in old age. Most people will not risk stopping work while they are still
physically and mentally able if they are not sure they have enough income to
supportthem until death. This idea oflinkage, the link between an employee's
expectations about private sector benefits and the ultimate realization of those
benefits, is critical to the employee's ability to formulate reliable financial
plans for retirement. Yet the private sector retirement systemn is one in which
employee expectations and reality often lack linkage. Moreover, because
private systems depend on voluntary employer participation and employer
flexibility, the problems of insufficient guarantees have no easy solution short
of fundamental redesign of the systems.
An intermediate solution may be to require more candid disclosure about
rights retained by employers to alter benefit programs and about how that may
affect employees. This solution, however, may alter, but would not increase,
the degree of certainty in the system because rational employees would
assume that employers would modify benefits to the detriment of employees
at a point when it was too late to make alternative arrangements. Ultimate
payment of benefits would then become a windfall to employees who have
made alternate arrangements.
This Article also suggests that the shift to an increasingly defined contri-
bution world has created further problems of uncertainty that, at least com-
pared to the world of defined benefit plans, compromise the ability of employ-
ems to accurately assess their income in retirement, which, in turn, depends on
assumptions about future rates of return, life expectancy, and interest rates (or
annuity purchase rates). The Social Security system, which historically has
provided a strong measure of certainty, provides a counterweight to this insta-
bility of employee expectations in the private pension system In particular,
the dual system of indexing provides certainty that benefits themselves are
likely at least to maintain an immediate pre-retirement standard of living.
Perhaps more important, the fact that the political will of the American
people underwrites the Social Security system and that the taxing and spending
power of the federal government supports it makes this public retirement
system an almost absolute source of certainty in retirement income for the
elderly. Converting the system to one of private accounts will necessarily
undermine that certainty, particularly ifthe system does not require mandatory
annuitization of benefits.
First, as discussed above, the Social Security system bases its benefit
structure on wage indexing of the earnings records that determine initial
retirement benefits as well as on price indexing of benefits in pay status (the
cost of living increases or "COLAs"). Thus, the initial benefit more accu-
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rately reflects increases in productivity over the worker's lifetime and guaran-
tees retirees a share of the national increase in standards of living through
their Social Security benefits.' Once benefits begin, the system indexes
them to price increases, thus ensuring that retirees' incomes, at least to some
extent, keep pace with their consumption needs.
In contrast to these virtual certainties, a private account system may or
may not adequately reflect productivity increases before retirement - returns
on investments depend on individual stock performance or on interest rates,
which a number of random factors having little to do with overall economic
productivity may affect.' Similarly, after retirement, unless the participant
used the account proceeds to purchase an inflation-adjusted annuity, it would
be very difficult for an individual retiree to know for certain whether an
accumulated amount would be sufficient to support her consumption needs
until death. Moreover, retirees must liquidate account balances invested in
most types of equity, such as stocks or real estate, to provide cash for direct
consumption. As a result, retirees would face a series of timing decisions (if,
that is, there were no requirement that they buy life annuities immediately at
retirement) concerning total or partial liquidation of their portfolios, decisions
which could be beneficial or disastrous depending on circumstances largely
out of the individual's control or predictive capacity." 4
The other linkage or expectation issue is the perhaps more basic one of
receipt of any benefits at all. Proponents for privatization of Social Security
frequently argue that the certainty of individual ownership of an account is a
principal advantage of a private account system, and they contrast the value of
private ownership with the uncertainty they see in a program subject to the
political system, aprogram that Congress theoretically can change on a whim.2
222. The importance of the wage-indexed benefit formula is highlighted by the recommen-
dation of the President's Social Security Commission to replace it with price indexing, as a way
to reduce all future benefits under Social Security. See Report, supra note 1, at 12-13, 71-72.
For an analysis of the effect of changing to price-indexing on benefit levels, see KILOLO KUAZI
& ROBERT GREENSI N, REP ACING 'WAGEINDEXING" WrIH'PRICEILDEXING' WOULDRESULT
IN DEEP REDUCTIONS OVER T&m IN SOCIAL SEcuiTY BENEFITS (Ctr. on Budget & Policy
Priorities Report, Dec. 14,2002), athttp./Avww.cbpp.org/l2-10-Olsocsco.htm.
223. See generally SHILIER, supra note 218.
224. A recent personal experience of one ofthe authors illustrates this problem. One elderly
parent with increasing levels of dementia required admittance to an assisted living facility, which
required a large up-front fee as well as sizeable monthly payments. The other elderly parent, also
in poor health, faced the prospect of having to finance this expense by either liquidating a stock
portfolio that had lost 30% of its value in the last eighteen months (since the beginning of 2000)
or selling the couple's home, thereby endangering her own financial security in the future. In
the end, the parent never had to make the choice, but the dilemma illustrates the problems of
basing old age financial security solely on the value ofaccumulated equity portfolios.
225. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that due process does
not require evidentiary hearing prior to termination of disability benefits).
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However, the contrast between the certainty granted by private ownership and
the uncertainty of the political process in this case may be more illusory than
real.
Since its enactment in 1935, the Social Security system has undergone
many changes, primarily expansions, but also some limited examples of
retrenchment. Most notably, in 1977, Congress made a correction inthe auto-
matic indexing formula and then, in the 1981-1983 budget and refinancing
bills, addressed the short-term financial difficulty the program was then in and
achieved some savings in the federal unified budget.
The most notable characteristic of the changes made to decrease Social
Security expenditures, however, is that only one - a six month delay in the
COLA in 1984 enacted as part of the 1983 refinancing bill - affected current
beneficiaries. All ofthe other types of cutbacks affected future beneficiaries -
that is, those not yet eligible to receive benefits. 227 Thus, one immediate
conclusion might be that unlike the stock market, which can deplete a retiree's
portfolio in a week or even overnight, the political system is extremely loath
to touch current benefits in any way except to provide an increase.
Second, since the changes made in 1983, there have been no real changes
in benefits promised to future recipients, let alone to current beneficiaries.'
This record is not unexpected given the growing numbers of voters at or near-
ing retirement age and the looming baby boom generation rapidly closing in on
age sixty-five. It is somewhat surprising, though, that so many advocates of
privatization would be willing to trade a system over which the public has
substantial policy control, through its vote, for one based solely on investment
performance, thus placing retirement in the lap of an institution, the stock
market, over which no one has any control. This skepticism about the power
of the public to work its will to maintain Social Security through the political
process may speak more to a generalized hostility to, and doubt about, the
efficacy of government programs generally than about specific weakness in the
public retirement system.
V. Conclusion
The private pension system, at its best, is a robust, creative system that
provides substantial retirement benefits to many American workers. The sys-
226. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat 65 (implement-
ing progressive increase in retirement age and eligibility); Social Security Amendments of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat 1509 (modifying indexation formula).
227. See Social SecurityAmendments of 1983, §§ 101-02 (expanding coverage); id. § 111
(delaying cost-of-living adjustment for 1983); ial §§ 121-25 (regulating taxation of Social
Security benefits in future and accelerating scheduled tax increases).
228. The only significant Social Security legislation enacted in the last ten years was to
make the Social Security Administration an independent agency, outside of the Department of
Health and Human Services.
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tern, however, is a voluntary one and employers design the particulars subject
to statutory minimum standards. Those minimum standards, as noted in this
Article, leave much flexibility to employers as to which employees will accrue
and ultimately earn benefits, what those benefits will be, whether those bene-
fits will change or terminate in the future, and whether employees can tap into
their benefits prior to retirement. There are advocates for reducing this flexi-
bility, for heightening benefit certainty, for increasing equity in the distribu-
tion of the tax subsidy for low- and moderate-income workers, and for reduc-
ing the amount of leakage from the system. Nonetheless, the business com-
munity, and to some extent organized labor, view flexibility to shape and
modify plan design as an essential component of the private pension system,
which may mean that political obstacles will interfere with attempts to in-
crease regulatory standards for retirement plans. Indeed, Congress has re-
cently reduced regulatory influence on the design of retirement plans.
One of the likely outcomes of this new congressional direction is a dimi-
nution of private sector retirement benefits for low- and moderate-income
workers. This Article has argued that a privatized Social Security system in-
valving individual investment accounts has potential to reduce Social Security
benefits for this same group of employees.
The Social Security system also provides a type of feature diversification
to our nation's overall retirement portfolio. The private system's robustness
may well require shielding employer flexibility from comprehensive govern-
ment regulation to protect employee expectation and to ensure preservation
of pension assets for retirement. The Social Security system, with its fixed
and certain defined benefits payable over the course of a wage earner's retire-
ment, is a significant counterweight to the weaknesses of the private pension
system. Adopting a system of private accounts would introduce many of the
private pension system's most glaring weaknesses into the parallel public sys-
tem. This suggests that caution should mark political discourse on the desir-
ability of private Social Security accounts.
If private accounts are to become part of the system, the design of those
accounts should take into consideration the need for predictability in benefits
and should safeguard against leakage. This would virtually require annui-
tization of account balances, and the system should index annuities to in-
creases inthe cost of living. Moreover, the design ofthe annuitizationimecha-
nism should anticipate potential problems that might create future political
pressure to relax mandatory annuitization.
Similarly, it would not be adequate for legislation creating private
accounts to bar pre-retirement access to assets. It should also recognize the
possibility ofevolving pressures to permit such access in the future. This may
involve erecting super-majority requirements to amend a private account sys-
tem to permit pre-retirement access. Of course, if all of these features were
part of a private account system, it would look remarkably like the current
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Social Security program in many ways, thus raising the important issue of
whether we should bother to make such a change to start with.
In 1987, Professor Michael Graetz argued that our polity should concep-
tualize a coherent and unified retirement policy, which begins with the recog-
nition that Social Security provides inadequate benefits for all income classes
and that the private pension system heavily favors the wealthy.2 At the time
that Professor Graetz was writing, he observed that Congress in 1986 was
"willing to go quite far in an effort to ensure some distribution of benefits to
low- and moderate-income eamers."O This Article suggests that agency-
initiated regulatory changes have pushed in the opposite direction and that in
the last decade Congress itself has reversed direction, increasing benefits for
the affluent and reducing regulatory requirements designed to ensure a mean-
ingful level of benefit distribution to others.
At the start of a new century, we still compartmentalize our retirement
policy by separate consideration of the private and public retirement systems.
As a result, our President and Congress see Social Security as a system in
financial crisis, perhaps requiring radical surgery - private investment ac-
counts financed through cuts in the guaranteed benefit - that will reduce the
flow of retirement income to the most needy elderly as well as to low- and
moderate-income retirees generally. At the same time, Congress enacted, and
the President signed, legislation that commits tens of billions of new dollars
of tax subsidy to a system that primarily finances retirement benefits for
America's most affluent citizens. If we viewed the private and public systems
as components of a single retirement policy and if we understood that the
ideal of using leverage to ensure some benefit distribution toward low- and
moderate-income workers in private sector retirement plans has never worked
well and is disappearing, Social Security reform might focus on improving
benefits for those who will not benefit from the publicly supported private-
sector pension system and not merely on shoring up its finances.
229. Michael . Gratz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Securi and Tax Policies,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 851,879,907 (1987).
230. Id. at 907.
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